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Floating man

"Flying Man" redirects here. For other uses, see Flying Man (disambiguation).
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The floating man, flying man, or man suspended in air argument is a thought experiment by the Persian philosopher Ibn Sina (Avicenna) which argues for the existence of the soul.[1] This thought experiment is used to argue in favor of knowledge by presence.[2][3]

Background

It has been said[by whom?] that Ibn Sina wrote the argument while imprisoned in the castle of Fardajan in the Iranian province of Hamadan. He concluded that the soul is immaterial and substantial. He also claimed that no human could deny their own consciousness or awareness.[4] According to Ibn Sina, the floating man could attain the concept of being without any sense experience.[5]

Using his knowledge, Ibn Sina saved one of the Iranian rulers, Shams al-Dawla, from death, which caused the envy of many of the courtiers. As a result, after the death of Shams al-Dawla, Ibn Sina was arrested and imprisoned in a castle between the Iranian provinces of Hamadan and Isfahan, where he supposedly wrote the floating man argument[citation needed]. The name of that castle is recorded in the old books as "Fardjan," "Mazdjan," or "Mazdavan."

Concept

The floating man argument considers a man who falls or floats freely in the air, unable to touch or perceive anything (as in a modern sensory deprivation chamber). This subject lacks any sensory perception data about the material world, yet is still self-aware, and is able to think to himself.

The Floating Man argument that is known today is the product of three distinct yet related versions. In the early days of its creation, Ibn Sina attempts to prove the dissociability of a consciousness and its physical body. In doing so, this initial version focuses on the principle of existential separability, the self and its ability to conceptualize its existence. In an attempt to solidify his argument, Sina expands his argument into what is known as the second version. In this updated version, Sina creates a new ideology, namely conceptual separability, which details that because the body and self are perceptible, one is able to conceptualize the self without the associated bodily parts. In the final edition of his argument, Sina brings into question self-awareness and the continuity of consciousness.[6]

Ibn Sina states that the eyes are the only thing preventing them from seeing anything externally, and he further describes that the floating man is created in the air, like a vacuum. Thus, this is to make sure that nothing was to overlap, allowing him the form to continue connecting with no issues. Additionally, he suggests that his extremities are separate and not interlocked. Therefore, since they are separate, Ibn Sina believes that he has no consciousness of his limbs, innards, heart or anything external to him that is truly there. Although He won't know his exact length, breadth, or depth, he will be aware of the existence of his essence. Even if he were to be conscious of his extremities, for instance, he still would perceive them as an essence of a condition of his essence. Therefore, he is warned and instructed to pay attention to the existence of his soul as something separate from his body and immaterial.

Existential separability

This form of separability concentrates on the unavoidable truth that exists within the self. The concept deals with the affirmation of the self, independent of anything - a certainty that exists naturally. Sina uses the word ānniyya to describe individual existence or quiddity, and declares its independence from the physical realm. Sina asserts the intrinsic essence of the ānniyya, regardless of its quantitative and qualitative characteristics.[6]

Conceptual separability

This version of separability expands on the ability to conceptualize the body and to conceive the self as a separate entity accordingly. When defining the ānniyya as a separate entity from the body, Sina believes it is essential to distinguish the external limbs and parts from the internal organs, specifically the brain. This is primarily due to the impossibility of determining whether the self would even be conceivable without the brain as a vessel. Sina argues that there must be a relationship between the intellect and the brain. However, none between the self and sensory stimuli or the external body.[6]

The immediateness and constancy of self-awareness

Sina argues that the self is immediate and is determined by no preceding action or activity. He states that no measure or operation could produce self-awareness. Similarly, Sina proclaims the continuity of self-awareness and that there is never a point at which the mind unaware of itself. He insists that a circumstance whereupon the absolute state of self-awareness would be interrupted, is impossible.[6]

Premises of the argument

According to Ibn Sina, we cannot deny the consciousness of the self. His argument is as follows:

One of us must suppose that he was just created at a stroke, fully developed and perfectly formed but with his vision shrouded from perceiving all external objects – created floating in the air or in the space, not buffeted by any perceptible current of the air that supports him, his limbs separated and kept out of contact with one another, so that they do not feel each other. Then let the subject consider whether he would affirm the existence of his self. There is no doubt that he would affirm his own existence, although not affirming the reality of any of his limbs or inner organs, his bowels, or heart or brain or any external thing. Indeed he would affirm the existence of this self of his while not affirming that it had any length, breadth or depth. And if it were possible for him in such a state to imagine a hand or any other organ, he would not imagine it to be a part of himself or a condition of his existence.

— Ibn Sina, quoted in Goodman (2013, pp. 155–156) [7]

We can deconstruct Ibn Sīnā's Floating Man argument into the following points:

1. The Floating Man is conscious of the existence of his soul without being conscious of the existence of his body.

2. The Floating Man validates the existence of his soul without validating the existence of his body.

3. When the Floating Man is taken out of his body; all that is left is his soul, which is validated in itself.[8]

Therefore, one may determine that:

4. Rejecting the existence of his soul is unimaginable, since it is necessary for his existence.

5. Rejecting the existence of his body is plausible, since it is not necessary condition to validate his existence.

6. Following the points 4 and 5: validating the existence of the soul without validating the existence of the body is plausible.[9]

This argument relies on an introspective thought experiment. We have to suppose a man who comes into existence fully developed and formed, but he does not have any relation with sensory experience of the world or of his own body. There is no physical contact with the external world at all. According to Ibn Sina, this subject is, nonetheless, necessarily conscious of himself. In other words, such a being possesses the awareness of his own existence. He thereby believes that the soul has an unmediated and reflexive knowledge of its own existence.[10] Thus appealing to self-consciousness, Ibn Sina tries to prove the existence of soul, or Nafs. Some scholars like Wisnovsky believe that the flying man argument proved the substantiality of the soul.[11] Ibn Sina believes that innate awareness is completely independent of sensory experience.[12][full citation needed]

Dualist perspective

The Floating Man argument is a dualist argument, supporting the idea that the mental realm is separate from the physical world (such as the physical body). In the argument of the floating man, Ibn Sina affirms the existence of a mental self, even without any physical perception. Many dualist philosophers have used this thought experiment to confirm the essence of the soul and other arguments of dualist origin.[13]

Descartes' famous phrase "Cogito ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am") bears some resemblance to the Floating Man argument, in that both argue for knowledge by presence. Whether these similarities are deep or trivial is a matter of scholarly disagreement.[11][clarification needed]

Criticism

Adamson[14] claims that even if the man floating in air were aware of himself, the argument fails to prove that the soul (the seat of that awareness) is something separate from the body: one could argue that self-awareness is seated in the brain. In being self-aware, the floating man is aware only through a property of his nervous system, whether or not he is aware of his nervous system.[14]

This[which?] argument is not supported by the concept of substance in metaphysics. This experiential field shows that the self is not consequently a substance and thereby there is no subjectivity.[15]

See also

References

  1. ^ Groff & Leaman 2007, p. 40
  2. ^ Mark van Atten; Pascal Boldini; Michel Bourdeau; Gerhard Heinzmann (2008). One Hundred Years of Intuitionism (1907–2007): The Cerisy Conference. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 121. ISBN 978-3-7643-8653-5.
  3. ^ Goodman 2013, p. 178
  4. ^ Katherine A. A. Zupan (24 April 2012). Philosophy for Breakfast. Lulu.com. p. 31. ISBN 978-1-105-54677-8.
  5. ^ Cary, Phillip; Doody, John; Paffenroth, Kim (2010). Augustine and Philosophy. Lexington Books. p. 216. ISBN 978-0-7391-4539-5.
  6. ^ a b c d Alwishah, Ahmed (2013). "Ibn Sīnā on Floating Man Arguments" (PDF). Journal of Islamic Philosophy: 23.
  7. ^ Avicenna's De Anima , Being the Psychological Part of Kitab Al-Shifa. Edited by F. Rahman
  8. ^ Alwishah, Ahmed (2013). "Ibn Sīnā on Floating Man Arguments" (PDF). Journal of Islamic Philosophy: 4.
  9. ^ Alwishah, Ahmed (2013). "Ibn Sīnā on Floating Man Arguments" (PDF). Journal of Islamic Philosophy: 4–5.
  10. ^ Groff & Leaman 2007, p. 40
  11. ^ a b Wisnovsky in Adamson & Taylor (2005, p. 103)
  12. ^ Black 2008, p. 138
  13. ^ Toivanen, Juhana (2011). "The Fate of the Flying Man: Medieval Reception of Avicenna's Thought Experiment". Retrieved November 28, 2022.
  14. ^ a b Adamson 2015, p. 84.
  15. ^ Nader El-Bizri 2000, pp. 149–150

Bibliography
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