User:AlexandreAssatiani/Research

Abstract

Introduction

Constitutional institutions of the Republic of Georgia

  • Law No. No. 376-I-s, signed on August 26, 1991, amended the constitution and regulated the relations between the Republic and the Government. The President appoints PM for the SC to approve and dismisses the PM with the consent of the SC. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/10/08/que_april_1974/)
    • The SC may vote no confidence on the Government with a 2/3 vote
    • These were regulated in Articles 104, 121(4), 124 of the Constitution
    • The Cabinet of Ministers is also appointed by the President and approved by the SC and its term lasts for the duration of the president's term, and resigns before the newly elected president (article 8 of Law No. 377-I-s)
    • The SC had the right to demand reports from the Cabinet.
  • The 1978 constitution and the 1991 amendments were seen as a transitional constitution (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/03/16/museridze_zviad/)
  • Before the constitutional reform of 1991, Sigua served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, i.e. head of the government. The creation of the presidential institution came with the nomination of the president as head of the government, thus lowering the powers of the newly-created Prime Minister. This was one of the reasons why Sigua ended up opposing Gamsakhurdia. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2010/11/01/int_alioni1/)
  • Gugushvili was appointed PM as representative of the St Ilia society (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2010/10/28/legitime_national/)

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  • When Gugushvili became PM, his task was the reorganization of the chaotic executive branch of government. He concentrated his support from VPM Guram Absandze, Industry Minister Nizharadze, and the Ministers of Communications and Culture, while VPM M. Omanidze and the Ministers of Health, IA, and Trade formed their own clan. Others were described by Gugushvili as "extremely passive". (25)
  • Tsugo Khelashvili was Head of the Administrative Department of the Cabinet of Ministers, but Gugushvili had no de facto power to replace him. Even his department was staffed with Gamsakhurdia's family, which led to alleged corruption or financial mismanagement. (25)
  • According to BG, the Chancellery was packed with spies working for the putschists. Copies of every draft order of the Cabinet were found in one rebel base after being taken over by government forces. (25)
  • Gugushvili appointed Alexandre Landia as Chancellor (Chief of Staff) of the Cabinet of Ministers to seek some order into the executive government.
  • Landia and Gugushvili set up the Administrative Academy of the Cabinet of Ministers, a school of training for elite bureaucrats that would have potentially staffed the executive government had the coup not happened, indicating some form of meritocracy was planned. (25-26)
  • Most state institutions created following the reforms started in August 1991 were cut short by the coup (26)
  • There was no established system of national security secrecy and classification, implying that every information leaked and there was no work discipline, causing instability throughout the presidency (37-38)
  • Gugushvili calls the government institutions a two-tier system, where the President represented the first tier and everyone else (from the PM down to the Supreme Council) were the second tier, a system inherited from the top-down informal organization of the nationalist dissident movement (38-39)
    • Gugushvili identified the following problems with that system:
      • Orders coming from echelons below the Presidency were deemed less important, therefore of lower priority and remained unfulfilled, which slowed down the workings of government
      • Any internal directive, including the government's, could be overturned by the President, giving opportunists large leeway to maneuver and influence the President.
      • The creation of special structures and independent agencies with defined rights and responsibilities was postponed and never implemented, creating large bureaucratic failings and room for corruption. This was justified with the notion that independent agencies could be "taken over by the KGB"
      • Appointments were done by impulse and via influence with no checks and balances and no room for meritocracy
  • A reform plan was introduced to the President in October for a future constitutional balance, but the coup prevented that from happening (38-39)

Institutional collapse amidst the Tbilisi War

  • Many remained loyal during the war. MPs of the Supreme Council remained in the Supreme Council building, at times forcing Zviad to remain inside the building to maintain him in position and preserve his safety. They have been called heroes by loyalists. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/12/23/22_12_2011/)
    • The Cabinet continued operating throughout the war, albeit harmed by several defecting ministers. Those who remained loyal were either with Gamsakhurdia or remained at the Government Chancellery.
    • The Prime Minister continued operating from the Chancellery building, preparing logistical defenses, amidst the war.
    • The Chancellery was guarded by OMON officers, who only had enough men to protect the building but not to protect individual ministers, forcing many to either stay in the building or risk their lives reaching the Supreme Council.
  • On November 27, 1991, on the eve of the Tbilisi War, Gamsakhurdia ordered Gugushvili to withdraw 2 million rubles from Binsocbank for a "special purpose" within the Main Economic Directorate, leading to conspiracy theories that ZG wanted to steal the money. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/08/18/case_7492801_gugushvili/)
  • Gugushvili left Tbilisi with Gamsakhurdia (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/03/06/this_day/)
  • During the first days of the war, the government controlled both the Government Building (Parliament) and the State Chancellery, where Gugushvili was managing what was left of the government, although communication between both became impossible without dangerous meetings between gugushvili and gamsakhurdia (53-55)

Doctrine of Necessity

Applied to the First Republic's Government in Exile

Institutions of the Republic of Georgia Amidst the Civil War

President of the Republic

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  • The Government and the Supreme Council were convened in Zugdidi before Gamsakhurdia's return but Gamsakhurdia nonetheless gave instructions to the Government on key issues, including the economy and on negotiating with the coup authorities, via envoys and radio communication from Grozny (60)
  • There were official presidential bodyguards who also defended key members of the government, although their selection process was obscure and said to involve personally Manana's influence, which led to questions about security and reliability. (60)
  • Before Zviad's return, much of the military operations were handled by Loti Kobalia, who was able to recapture several towns in Samegrelo in 1992 before Zviad returned, seemingly without direct coordination (61-62)
  • The President and the military leadership were deeply organized in arranging military operations together, usually with the Cabinet playing only a secondary and logistical role (65-67)

Government

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  • Gugushvili sought to implement several government reforms to address the challenges that he had identified as preventing effective state management during his time as PM in Tbilisi. Some of those reforms were implemented in Zugdidi, especially concerning a larger public involvement in appointments. (38-39)
  • In June 1992, Gugushvili was against the return of Zviad to Georgia, arguing that the situation needed to develop for a year-year and a half before he risked his life. (58-60)
  • Gugushvili insisted that Zviad does not return to Zugdidi until after he's set up base there first and brought back an oral report via radio (58-60)
  • Upon returning to Zugdidi, the Gugushvili government was given by President Gamsakhurdia three main instructions: (60)
    • Organize the economy and the social sphere, especially amidst threat of large-scale theft and pillaging from paramilitary groups as the war in Abkhazia was scaling up, ensuring proper harvesting, and setting up strategic reserves of tea, corn, and more
    • Launch negotiations with the parliamentary opposition and the coup authorities in Tbilisi, including the following starting compromise from Gamsakhurdia: reinstating the president with his powers, clarification of the parliamentary speaker, new elections organized by both the Supreme Council and the new Parliament, for which a legal interim status would be created as a new chamber
  • Some cabinet ministers never left Georgia, but instead found refuge in Zviadist strongholds, such as Tamaz Vashadze, Construction Minister who handles the passage of Zviadist loyalists between Adjara and Samegrelo (61-62)
  • Guram Absandze, Deputy PM, returns to Georgia from Moscow via a flight that lands in Batumi, shoprtly after Gugushvili's return. This indicates Gugushvili's return started a major push for everyone to return before Zviad himself (61-62)
  • After Zviad died, Gugushvili had to return back to Grozny, again via Batumi (61-62)
  • In Zugdidi, the Cabinet played only a secondary role in military planning of operations. (63-67)
  • Zviad dispatched G. Absandze to Sokhumi and Gudauta to organize negotiations with Abkhaz separatist leadership, including on the suggestion of an Abkhaz-Samegrelo confederation (67-68)

Supreme Council

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  • Upon the return of the legitimate government in Samegrelo, the loyalist Supreme Council held a session in Zugdidi (likely in June?), without any incidents. (58-60)
    • The Supreme Council began to resemble the main gathering metaphorical location of Zviadist loyalists from across the country, who would travel to Zugdidi for discussions and to show support. (58-60)
    • The Zugdidi session of the supreme council happened while Zviad was still in Grozny (58-60)
      • Merab Kiknadze was also in Grozny, and it's in August that Zviad started pushing for a large return to Samegrelo (58-60)
  • Informally, the Supreme Council in Zugdidi expressed its opposition to a proposal by the Confederation of Mountain Peoples to create a Samegrelo-Abkhazia confederation (65-67)
    • It was that opposition that solidified the end of an informal cooperation between Abkhaz forces and Zviadists (65-67)

Opposing Coup Authorities

  • On March 13, 1992, the Supreme Council, gathered in Grozny, declared that the Military Council "and other institutions" were "usurpation of power" and all acts adopted by them were declared null and void, including the calling of new parliamentary elections.
    • The resolution also called the organizers of the coup as guilty of "high treason", though stopping short of listing the names.
  • The Military Council and State Council received blessing from the Georgian Orthodox Church, which was seen by some as a form of legitimacy (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/05/04/z-g_anderdzi1/)
  • The State Council sought to recruit Supreme Council members to run in 1992 as an attempt to secure legitimacy (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/03/24/t_qoridze_k_gamsakhurdia/)
  • For the Tbilisi coup authorities, the Samegrelo government was a band of insurgents, not a President, Cabinet, and Supreme Council (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/03/11/kurxeuli_damkveti/)
  • Gamsakhurdia wrote an open letter to Shevardnadze on april 19, 1992 about abkhazia: "You see that you cannot subdue Georgia with the help of "Mkhedrioni" and "Gvardia" alone, and therefore, you are widely involving the CIS troops in the military operation, who are currently camped together with the junta troops near the village of Rukh and are planning to invade Abkhazia in order to unleash a new ethnic conflict there." (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2010/08/24/catechizm_abkh_targets/)

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  • Gugushvili believes that the war in Abkhazia was started by the Shevardnadze government to destablilize Gamsakhurdia and prevent an Abkhazia-Samegrelo unity that could take over the country. (58-60)
  • Upon the beginning of the war in Abkhazia, Kitovani announced "Soon we will bring Zviad to Tbilisi,whether voluntarily or by force" (58-60)

Domestic Recognition

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  • For those who backed Gamsakhurdia, their loyalty was not seen internally as loyalty towards a warring faction, but towards the constitutional state against rebels (4-7)
  • By the end of June 1992, Zviadist loyalists controlled the districts of Zugdidi, Tsalenjikha, and Chkhorotsku (58-60)
    • They also swayed significant influence over eastern Abkhazia in the early days of the Abkhazia war (58-60)
  • By the defeat in Sokhumi, all of Samegrelo, except for Poti, was firmly in Gamsakhurdia's hands (58-60)
  • Though Adjara was formally under Shevardnadze's control, many Zviadists roamed freely in Batumi. This is evidenced with the fact that several of Gugushvili's cabinet were in Batumi in the summer of 1992, while Gugushvili himself arrived in Georgia via Batumi, where he was met by Tamaz Vashadze, Construction Minister. Guram Absandze, First Deputy PM, arrived in Batumi via Moscow. (61-62)
    • Much of western Georgia was under less-stable control of the Shevardnadze regime. For much of 1992, the only checkpoint under junta control was in Khobi, controlling passage from Batumi to Samegrelo (61-62)
  • There was a level of communication between Zviadist forces and Abkhaz separatist troops. Abkhaz and Zviadist generals coordinated at least partially certain moves of the president in the Gali-Ochamchire section (63-65)
    • There was at least at some point a tentative to use Abkhaz forces to fight the junta with Zviad (63-65)

International Recognition

  • Gugushvili continued to serve for several months in the Dudayev government of Ichkeria after the death of Gamsakhurdia. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2014/01/01/b-gugushvili-cv/)
  • In 1992, when the OSCE was organizing field trips to assess Georgia's potential membership, the delegations refused to meet with partisans of Gamsakhurdia, claiming such meetings would "not influence the outcome" (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2012/06/24/kiknadze_gamsakhurdia_europe/)
    • But meanwhile, in the summer of 1992, the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow (Czechoslovakia chaired the OSCE in 1992) sent a delegation to meet Gamsakhurdia in Grozny
    • Finnish MP Heikki Riihijärvi was pushing, in vain, to have Gamsakhurdia invited to the Helsinki summit that allowed gEORGI TO join the osce. Shevardnadze was already invited, which was assessed by Merab Kijknadze as being a collective decision of the OSCE.
    • In August 1992, Kiknadze traveled from Grozny to Lithuania to meet, on the president’s orders, with the Seimas Speaker Vytautas Landsbergis. Landsbergis and Azerbaijan’s leader Abulfaz Elchibey showed principled firmness in assessing the events in Georgia, which was especially noteworthy amid widespread silence and, even more, enthusiasm for the so-called “democratic revolution.” After Shevardnadze’s return to Georgia, Landsbergis publicly stated: “A coup d’état has taken place in Georgia. I doubt that Shevardnadze’s international authority will be sufficient to legitimize the regime.”
    • During the 1992 summit in Istanbul, Elchibey distanced himself from Shevardnadze: “You are not the country’s elected leader, and I must refrain from dealings with you.” (This story was later recounted to me in Baku in the autumn of 1992 by Isa Gambarma, then speaker of the Milli Majlis.)
    • Lithuania was one of the last European countries to establish diplomatic relations with Shevardnadze’s government. After losing the parliamentary elections in 1992 and moving into the opposition, Landsbergis intensified his stance against the illegal regime.
    • Kkiknadze and Gamsakhurdia traveled to Europe in november 1992. They used Ichkerian travel documents. And they traveled alongside a XChechen delegation.
      • The delegation met with several Turkish MPs in Istanbul in November 1992
      • In Helsinki, Gamsakhurdia accused the United States of conspiring with Gorbachev and communist nomenclatura to overthrow him.
    • Throughout their trip, the delegation encountered many difficultis moving around, with countries like Germany refusing to issue Gamsakhurdia a visa
    • But he was ninetheless granted access to Austria, with appeal from the British hELSINKI gROUP (Austria;s neutrality)
  • The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’s leadership (President Dzhokhar Dudayev, Vice-President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Interior Minister) receives, hosts, and formally negotiates with the Georgian exile leadership/family representatives, treating Gamsakhurdia as a head of state. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/06/02/m_kiknadze_1/)
    • Dudayev’s formulation — “for us, the family’s wish is law” — and his decree transferring the Grozny residence (“Tower”) and yard to the Gamsakhurdia family are head-of-state acts acknowledging presidential status.
  • Mate Tsikhelashvili, an MP in Ichkeria, continues to recognize the legitimacy of the national government (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/05/04/z-g_anderdzi1/)
  • According to Moris Museridze, a legitimist author, Georgia's UN accession was based on the 1991 declaration of independence and referendum preceding it, thus arguing that international recognition was linked to the Gamsakhurdia government and its continuity, not the new Shevardnadze regime (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/03/16/museridze_zviad/)

Exile Period

Supremacy of the Constitution

Principle of Constitutional Continuity

Continuing Remnant Principle

Remaining Institutions Following the War

  • Jambul Bokuchava of the National Guard called on everyone to recognize Besarion Gugushvili as legitimate represenative of the national government after Gamsakhurdia's death (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2012/05/24/bokuchava/)
  • Algirdas Patackas, Lithuanian MP, was an international witness who saw both the digging in Didi Khibula and the reburial in Grozny in 1994 (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/12/17/%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%8F%D0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D1%87%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE/)
  • Nemo Burchuladze continued to serve as Vice-Speaker. Absanadze as Finance Minister and Deputy PM (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/11/11/chicago_tribune/)
  • The Ichkerian government served as a mediator between the exile authorities and the Shevardnadze government immediately following Gamsakhurdia's death, with Chechen VP Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev flying to Georgia to oversee the burial of Gamsakhurdia's body to Grozny (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/08/20/guram_sharadze/)
  • After the occupation of Samegrelo by Baltin and by Shevardnadze’s bands hiding behind him—and after the start of bandit-style repressions—a significant portion of Gamsakhurdia’s armed supporters took to the forests of Samegrelo as small partisan units, which offered passive resistance to Shevardnadze’s bands. One such partisan unit, for example, was Badri Zarandia’s detachment, which sheltered Z. Gamsakhurdia and his accompanying group for several days. It is well known that some of these partisan units persisted even until the “Rose Revolution.” (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/06/04/corridor/)
    • In the end, in November–December 1993 and January 1994, the situation in Samegrelo can be characterized as anarchy, chaos, and absence of control.
    • Gugushvili himself hid from Shevardnadze and Russian troops by shaving his moustache and disguising himself as an Abkhaz IDP
    • The Chechen government interceded to facilitate the repatriation of Gugushvili to Chechnya after Gamsakhurdia's death.
  • Upon Gamsakhurdia's death, Merab Kiknadze (Chairman of the SC) was appointed to represent gamsakhurdia's interests in front of the international group monitoring the reburial (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/06/03/lithuania_/)
  • Mentions of the President’s Guard commander (Abu Arsanukayev) and named bodyguards (Bachuki Gvantseladze, Zaza Burjanadze, Robinson Margvelani, Gocha Kekenadze) show a functioning protective service attached to the presidency in exile. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/06/02/m_kiknadze_1/)
    • Operational decisions (e.g., guarding, couriering news, guiding to the temporary burial site, escorting remains) were carried out by this structure, suggesting maintained executive security command.
  • A Georgian “delegation” arrives to Grozny that is actually a multi-agency investigative team (Prosecutor’s Office, State Security, MIA), revealing direct institutional engagement between Tbilisi authorities and the exile-centered process. Later, in Tbilisi, procedural negotiations continue (fueling, security perimeters, site access, inspection modalities), demonstrating protocol-like bargaining rather than ad hoc dealings.
    • The Georgian side edited participation lists, striking out four Supreme Council members (including Kiknadze) from the transfer mission—ironically acknowledging their institutional status enough to exclude them.
    • The coffin was draped with a Georgian national flag brought from Chechnya; Dudayev pressed for burial with state honors. These are state ceremonials aligned with continuity of the presidency and government, not merely private rites.
    • The itinerary and assets (e.g., Tu-134 aircraft, helicopter transfer to Jikhashkari, staged movements via Senaki) illustrate that the exile government and its foreign patrons could plan and execute complex, multi-leg operations with security protocols—capacity typical of organized state actors.
    • Kiknadze serves as conduit between the family and Dudayev; Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev leads a 40-day telephone negotiation marathon, reporting almost daily to Dudayev—evidence of structured diplomatic mediation linking the exile presidency/family, a host government, and (implicitly) Georgian authorities.
    • Kiknadze notes he attended the meeting with the shevardnadze side in grozny as the family’s representative “and not” as the exiled SC Chairman, but his presence, the initial inclusion of SC members on the mission manifest, and his role in shaping terms underscore that institutional actors of the exile government were the ones executing and legitimating the process, even when framed as “family” choices.
    • MP Guram Sharadze (Shevardnadze) Acted as informal intermediary in multiple stages of negotiation between the two sides.
  • Zviad’s body arrived in Grozny on February 14, 1994
  • The reburial commission included members of the supreme council, alongside representatives from ichkeria, chechnya, and the lithuanian parliament (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/02/22/gogolashvili_pres-ge/)
  • after the reburial in grozny, gugushvili sought the supreme council to create a special commission to investigate the circumstances of the death of gamsakhurdia, which the supreme council seeminhly rejected (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2010/11/01/paata_mtavroba/)

April 1994 Crisis

Supreme Council Elections

  • In April 1994 (April 1–2 according to the documents), Manana Archvadze, encouraged by Kremlin and Shevardnadze security services, began operations to proclaim herself a “Queen Tamar.” She convened in Grozny a small group of submissive deputies of the Supreme Council, who, under her terror and intimidation, were coerced into participating in an internal coup against the legitimate national government and the national-religious movement. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/10/08/que_april_1974/)
    • Illegitimate Resolution - On the Early Dismissal of the Chairman of the Supreme Council
      • The Supreme Council resolves to accept the resignation of Chairman Merab Kiknadze.
      • Signed: Acting Chairman B. Cholokashvili, Grozny, 1 April 1994
      • This “resolution” was signed by Cholokashvili before he was even elected Acting Chairman.
    • Illegitimate Resolution On the Election of the Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council
      • Due to the resignation of Chairman M. Kiknadze and the incapacity of Vice-Chairman N. Burchuladze, the Supreme Council elects Bidzina Cholokashvili as Acting Chairman. Grozny, 1 April 1994
      • No legitimate head of state, prime minister, or presiding officer attended this “session.”
  • Resolution On the Early Dismissal of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/10/03/internal_que_1/)
    • On the basis of the statement of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia dated 31 March 1994, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia decrees:
  1. 1. The wish of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia shall be satisfied, and Mr. Merab Kiknadze shall be dismissed from the position he holds;
  2. 2. This resolution enters into force upon adoption.
  3. Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia /B. Cholokashvili/
  4. Grozny, 1 April 1994

    • Resolution On the Election of the Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia
  1. In connection with the fact that the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia has resigned (Merab Kiknadze is meant — ed.), and the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia (Nemo Burchuladze is meant) is unable to perform his assigned duties, in accordance with Article 114 of the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia decrees:
  2. 1. Mr. Bidzina Cholokashvili, a member of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia, shall be elected Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia;
  3. 2. This resolution enters into force upon adoption.
    • During the internal coup, none of the state’s leaders, nor even the leaders of the Supreme Council itself, were present at the so-called session of the “Supreme Council” — neither President Z. Gamsakhurdia (deceased), nor Prime Minister B. Gugushvili, nor Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council M. Kiknadze, nor Deputy Chairman N. Burchuladze.

Abolition of the Presidency

  • Mate Tsikhelashvili (pro-Gugushvili) also opposed filling the post of President after Zviad's death, arguing in the Chechen case that presidents are "elected by a nation, not in a forest" (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/10/31/tsikhesashvili_1/)
  • Since the Constitution allowed only the President to dismiss the Prime Minister, the coupists took what they thought was a shortcut — they abolished the presidential institution by suspending the constitutional chapter on the presidency. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/10/08/que_april_1974/)
    • Illegitimate Law “On the Suspension of Chapter 13/1 of the Constitution — ‘The President of the Republic of Georgia’”
    • On the pretext that Georgia was occupied by Russian forces and annexed through the CIS, making elections impossible, the Supreme Council decreed:
      • “The operation of Chapter 13/1 ‘The President of the Republic of Georgia’ shall be suspended until the restoration of independence and lawful authority in Georgia.”
      • Signed by Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council, B. Cholokashvili, Grozny, 2 April 1994.
    • By suspending this chapter, the coupists destroyed not only the presidency but the entire executive branch, including the Cabinet of Ministers, whose legal existence was tied to the President’s term. This was, in effect, high treason — a change from a presidential to a parliamentary republic without any referendum or public consent. No head of state or senior leader was present at this “session.”
  • Law of the Republic of Georgia On the Suspension of the Operation of Chapter 13/1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia — “The President of the Republic of Georgia” (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/10/03/internal_que_1/)
  1. In view of the fact that the Republic of Georgia is occupied by the armed forces of Russia and has in effect been annexed through the CIS, which makes the practical implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia impossible, in particular the holding of free elections, on the basis of Article 104, part two of the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia decrees:
  2. 1. The operation of Chapter 13/1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia — “The President of the Republic of Georgia” — shall be suspended until the restoration of the state independence of Georgia and the re-establishment of lawful authority in the country;
  3. 2. This law shall enter into force upon signature by the Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia.

    • The dismissal of M. Kiknadze is signed by “Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia, B. Cholokashvili” **before** he had been elected to that post.


Clash with Government

  • Following the clash, Gugushvili started using the term "Presidium of the Government of the Republic in exile" (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2012/05/11/elections/)
  • Part of the clash was linked with Archvadze's claim that Gugushvili was involved with the murder of Gamsakhurdia, which BG claimed was fabricated so Archvadze could become PM herself. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/11/11/crime/)
    • Some members of the Supreme Council and the Cabinet backed her on this.
    • The same members refused to support a demand of Gugushvili that the forensic medical examination be performed immediately before the burial in Grozny with the participation of trusted experts from Dudaev's administration and invited Lithuanian specialists.
    • Later, driven by her own far-reaching and malicious plans, Archvadze turned the deputies of the Supreme Council — either her subordinates or deceived followers — against Bessarion Gugushvili, organized an internal coup, and dismissed him from the position of Prime Minister. Having done so, she conveniently “forgot” that Gugushvili was supposedly the “murderer,” and instead shifted her attack to Vice-Premier Guram Absandze, accusing him of organizing the murder of Z. Gamsakhurdia.
  • The events of April 1994 were called an "internal coup" by the Gugushvili clan (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/10/08/que_april_1974/)
    • At the height of this, the main obstacle to Archvadze’s ambitions was Prime Minister Bessarion Gugushvili — Gamsakhurdia’s closest ally and, after his death, the only legitimate candidate for Head of State, as the acting Chairman of the Supreme Council, Merab Kiknadze, had announced his resignation. Thus, the coup leaders’ primary target became Gugushvili.
    • Illegitimate Resolution On the Dismissal of the Prime Minister of Georgia
      • The Supreme Council resolves: Prime Minister Bessarion Gugushvili is dismissed from office. Grozny, 1 April 1994. Signed: Acting Chairman B. Cholokashvili
      • According to law, a vote of no confidence requires the support of two-thirds of the Council — violated during this coup. Furthermore, only the President has the authority to dismiss the Prime Minister; Parliament has none.
      • The Strange Explanation of Acting Chairman B. Cholokashvili: Cholokashvili’s childish letter to Gugushvili claims he was dismissed because he had become a member of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Chechen Republic, allegedly turning that into his “main activity,” neglecting his Georgian office.
      • This is hypocritical, since from April 1994 to 1997 — over three years — Archvadze’s faction had no appointed Prime Minister at all, despite claiming that the office “requires constant effort.” Such was the duplicity and deceit of the coupists.
  • During the internal coup, none of the state’s leaders, nor even the leaders of the Supreme Council itself, were present at the so-called session of the “Supreme Council” — neither President Z. Gamsakhurdia (deceased), nor Prime Minister B. Gugushvili, nor Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council M. Kiknadze, nor Deputy Chairman N. Burchuladze. Under these circumstances, the internal coup plotters effectively abolished the position of head of the executive branch and, by simultaneously “dismissing” the Prime Minister, left the legitimate government without an executive branch. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/10/03/internal_que_1/)
    • But the main point here is that an act of the highest treason took place: without consulting the people (without a referendum or plebiscite) the system and type of the Georgian state was changed — for an indefinite period and on the basis of an indeterminate, hard-to-ascertain condition (“until independence and lawful authority are restored”) — the presidential republic was replaced with a parliamentary republic!
    • It is also notable that changing the state system to a parliamentary republic for an indefinite period was not accompanied by the absolutely necessary and mandatory amendments to the Constitution and derivative legislation that would follow from changing the systems of head of state and head of the executive branch.

Ultra Vires Doctrine

Temporary & Limited Mandate

Principle of Majority within Legitimacy

Competing Claims

Besarion Gugushvili

  • In an August 2016 interview with Chveneburi, Gugushvili continued to state that "no legal document on his removal as Prime Minister exists". (https://www.chveneburi.net/ka/interviu-besarion-gugusvili-roportaj,14.html)
  • In a September 2000 interview with Smena.ru, he called himself "Prime minister in exile", from his asylum in Finland, where he arrived after leaving Grozny in 1994 (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2018/07/22/smena/)
  • In a June 2018 interview with an Estonian newspaper, he continued to claim legitimacy as PM of the first democratically elected government of Georgia (https://besarion.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/gruusia-peaminister-elab-pagulasena-soomes-ja-kardab-kodumaale-tagasi-pc3b6c3b6rduda.pdf)
    • Gugushvili sought exile in Estonia after Chechnya but was rejected by the Maar government, forcing him to move to Finland.
    • He assesses that, "Only President Zviad Gamsakhurdia could have dismissed me from office, but he did not."
    • He also states that, "The coup in January 1993 was a crime carried out with the support of the rebels and the Russians against a democratically elected president and his government"
    • Some media reports in 2018 claimed that the Georgian government had begun compensating the Gugushvili family over the confiscation of property and, while Gugushvili himself has never sought to return to Georgia, his family has.
    • Gugushvili maintains that Gamsakhurdia killed himself.
  • Gugushvili has been associated with the main anti-Shevardnadze fighters of the 1990s, which were designated a Terrorist Group in 1998 by the U.S. State Department ("Zviadists"). Gugushvili himself has opposed the Zviadist factions that chose to form a domestic opposition to Shevardnadze within Georgia's structures, and backed openly those who remained "violently opposed". (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2015/12/21/usa_frendship/)
    • They have been involved in bombings, kidnappings, and attempted assassinations on Shevardnadze, and even took UN personnel hostage in 1998.
    • They operated mostly in Mingrelia, but were suspected to have received support and training in Chechen terrorist training camps.
  • In a 2014 interview, the newspaper Sakartvelos Respublika called him the "legitimate Prime Minister" (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2015/01/07/mikeladze-gugushvili/)
    • Gugushvili refuses to return to Georgia because he refuses to take the pension that the current government has assigned to him, and rejects cooperation with the Prosecutor's Office, which still has not closed the case against him and Gamsakhurdia (only suspended it).
    • In that interview, he continued to assert that he still is the Prime Minister of the Republic of Georgia
    • He asserts that returning to Georgia would be tantamount to entering an enemy state.
    • "My return would automatically mean betraying the state whose Prime Minister I am (or, if you prefer, was), and betraying the thousands of people who died heroically. It would mean betraying the cause we fought for and yielding to the current situation."
    • In 2014, Gugushvili said there still was a Cabinet of Ministers legitimate
  • In his CV, published in 2014, he called himself the Legitimate Prime Minister of Georgia (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2014/01/01/b-gugushvili-cv/)
  • Gugushvili has continuously maintained that Gamsakhurdia killed himself
  • On May 26, 2012, Gia Chkhikvadze (Acting Chairman), Mowgli Chkhikvadze, Nodar Bokuchava, Lili Gulua of the Saint Ilia Society issue a declaration in front of the supreme council building in tbilisi, rejecting the legitimacy of either saakashvili or ivanishvili, and instead recognized Besarion Gugushjvili as legitimate government (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2012/05/28/26-05-2012/)
  • Ahead of the 2012 parliamentary elections, Gugushvili issued a declaration on behalf of the "Presidium of the Government of the Republic of Georgia in exile", calling on the population to boycott the elections as illegitimate (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2012/05/11/elections/)
  • In the 2010s (maybe before as well), the Georgian Helsinki Union – National Revival was almost interchangeable with the institutions of the Gugushvili government. On May 6, 2012, a meeting of the union also included decisions to "reassign members of the presidium"
  • In a February 2011 written statement affirming Gamsakhurdia's suicide, Gugushvili signed his name as "PM of THE rEPUBLIC OF GEORGIA" (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/03/04/position_siucide/)
  • The Georgian National Salvation Movement – Resistance Front, created in 1992 in Tbilisi from the leftovers of the University Society grassroots movement that existed during the Gamsakhurdia presidency, and headed by Moris Museridze, continued to recognize Gugushvili over Archvadze (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/02/18/moris_museridze/)
  • On December 2, 2006, a group of national figures led by Gugushvili signed a joint declaration calling for: (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2008/09/03/nationalist-hysteria/)
    • Restoration of constitutional legitimacy and rejection of the post-1992 order
    • Reclassification of the Abkhazia and South Ossetian conflicts as Russian-Georgian war and deoccupation should be the main ask of the state, not reconcilaition
    • Withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory, including peacekeepers, and withdrawal from the CIS, which was illegitimate, and declaring null all treaties legitimizing the presence of Russian troops
    • Signed by: B. Gugushvili, S. Amiranashvili, K. Akubardia, Tamaz Bachulashvili, Yuri Burkadze, Maia Gurgenidze, Vova Vekua, Yuri Vekua, Konstantine Vekua, Manuchar Tophadze, Nukri Kvaliashvili, Besik Lomize, Roland Matiashvili, Aleksandre Sandukhadze, Longi Partsvania, Ioseb Gudushauri, Grigol Shurgaia, Nodar Chachanidze, Lasha Chkhenkeli, Darejan Tskhadadze.
  • Gugushvili has continiously maintained that legitimacy was rooted not only in constitutional law but also religious, and he saw Gamsakhurdia's legitimacy as being the leader of a nationalist-religious movement (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2010/10/28/legitime_national/)
  • Gugushvili also served as Permanent Representative of Ichkeria in Finland, appointed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2010/11/01/paata_mtavroba/)

Manana Archvadze

  • According to Gugushvuili, Archvadze designed the plans to accuse Gugushvili of being involved in the murder of Gamsakhurdia so she could become PM herself (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/11/11/crime/)
  • Most deputies involved in this Grozny coup were later expelled by Archvadze, who eventually reduced her “Supreme Council” to only a couple of loyal followers. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/10/08/que_april_1974/)
    • Later, in 1997, Archvadze and her faction returned from Moscow — the capital of the occupying power — and appointed her “Prime Minister,” again in full violation of the Constitution, with Shevardnadze’s regime’s support.
  • Despite the tragic tone of this “law,” and despite the fact that nothing substantive changed in Georgia, in 1997 Archvadze and her putschist “Supreme Council” returned from Moscow (!) — i.e., from the capital of the aforementioned occupying power — “elected” Manana Archvadze as “Prime Minister,” and began to destroy the remnants of the national movement. (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/10/03/internal_que_1/)
  • In 2004, upon signing of the National Reconciliation Memorandum in January, Manana Archvadze and Tariel Putkaradze opposed the signing of the memorandum, instead asking for a full investigation into the death of gamsakhurdia and the recognition of the legitimacy of the supreme council in exile (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/03/09/treason/)
    • Gugushvili saw it as betrayal, as recognizing the legitimacy of the supreme council in exile meant recognizing the end of its term as well
  • Gugushvili says that T. Futkaradze, A. Zhghenti and other "internal putschists" are behind the push to make Archvadze claim to be PM (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/03/09/internal_que/)
  • In 1997, when the Round Table announced it would participate in elections, Archvadze returned to Georgia from Moscow to take its leadership. (https://chatgpt.com/c/6900d080-d9b4-8330-ae60-a2d0ad6e9d21)
    • She set up her own Round Table organization, alongside Supreme Council members and former prefects of the Gamsakhurdia government who had remained in Georgia
    • She theatrically announced the reformation of the Supreme Council
    • She called for a boycott of the 1999 elections
    • In 1999, she won a court case by the Vake District Court granting her rights over the Round Table
    • One of the members of the supreme council that sided with archvadze was avtandil rtkhiladze, who recruited Tariel Putkaradze (he had been inactive since 1993). He was asked, in 1998, to participate in supreme council sessions
    • Putkaradze in his memoirs: "Mr. Gugushvili lies when he accuses me of “internal putschism.” The places for Gugushvili (in exile) and for the presidium members of the Supreme Council abroad had already been taken by these more active people who had returned to Georgia."
    • The first Supreme Council assembly to meet after the civil war was at the leadership of the Manana, at the house of MP Bimurza Dadeshkeliani in the autumn of 1998
  • Gugushvili has refused to recognize Archvadze's attempts at legitimizing under current Georgian jurisdiction the Round Table, calling it a tool of the Shevardnadze regime (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2010/09/20/archvadze-pupit/)
    • Archvadze appointed herself a cabinet of ministers
    • Following the Rose Revolution, the Archvadze government, in a letter signed by Viktor Pkhaladze on 2 Feb 2004, proposed the creation of a 7-member state commission chaired by Saakashvili, and including Manana Archvadze-Gamsakhurdia (PM), Tariel Putkaradze (Chair of SC HR Commission), Merab Raphava (Deputy MIA), Manana Tabidze (civil society), and Viktor Pkhaladze (Deputy Chair of the SC)
    • Archvadze was elected prime minister by the supreme council in 2000
    • The State Commission was appointed by Saakashvili on February 21, 2004

2025 Claims

Conclusion

  • For Gugushvili, the legitimacy of the Georgian state must rely on Orthodox Christianity, and that is the only way it can survive. He assesses that a legitimate government would be one rooted in Orthodox Christianity, which he claims was the vision of Gamsakhurdia.
  • In May 2011, a group of supporters of the legitimate government, including Vice PM Ghudushauri, issued a statement calling on the Georgian Orthodox Church to recognize the legitimate government and to convene a new Ruisi-Urbnisi Council (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/05/04/z-g_anderdzi1/)
  • In April 2011, Supreme Council MP Temur Koridze condemned the Koko Commission and all former members of the SC who cooperated with it as breaking legitimacy (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/03/24/t_qoridze_k_gamsakhurdia/)
  • On March 11, 2025, the Parliament of Georgia recognized the legitimacy of the gamsakhurdia government till the end (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/03/11/kurxeuli_damkveti/)
  • On January 26, 2004, a Memorandum of National Reconciliation was signed at Kashveti Church that pledged a pardon for the exiled member of government, honor to the name of Gamsakhurdia, repatriation of his remains, and legal assessment of the 1991-1992 events.
    • The memorandum was prepared by a National Reconciliation Commission chaired by Absandze
  • The Zviadist movement, organized still under the Round Table - Free Georgia organization, announced an end to its street demonstration on May 26, 1997 - instead choosing to run in elections (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2011/02/18/museridze_archvadze/)
  • On March 11, 2005, the Parliament of Georgia passed a resolution that post facto recognized the legitimacy of the Supreme Council and Zviad Gamsakhurdia's government for the full extent of the latter's term (1996) (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2010/09/28/legitimacy_/)
    • 1. The Parliament of Georgia reaffirms the legitimacy of the Supreme Council of Georgia elected on October 28, 1990 and the President of Georgia elected on May 26, 1991, as well as the structures subordinate to them (including the Armed Forces) and local self-government and governance bodies within the time limits established by relevant legislation .
  • Gugushvili has claimed over and over again that no election can be legitimate without his approval as the bearer of legitimacy (https://besarion.wordpress.com/2010/11/01/int_mtavar1/)

Sources

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