The following is the Extended Essay that I wrote for my International Baccalaureate Diploma. I am posting it here for reference use while I write my submissions to various Wikipedia articles.

This paper investigates the question: to what extent did the loss of experienced combat pilots really contribute to Japanese defeat in the Pacific War? This question is approached through the use of primary sources to determine objectives, strategic thought, and pilot behavior, and secondary sources to more completely view the macro aspects of the Pacific War. This essay’s scope are the years 1937 through 1945, which is the start of Second Sino-Japanese War through the end of the Pacific War. The majority of the essay is devoted to studying the evolution of Japanese airpower over the course of the war, comparing and contrasting its downward trend with the loss of experienced combat pilots, increasing American airpower, and overall gradual Japanese defeat. In this way, the first section of the essay discusses initial Japanese airpower, while the second section tackles its decline. The third section covers a variety of counterclaims that provide alternate causes of Japanese defeat. Analysis of Japanese doctrine, tactical and strategic planning among other items is conducted to demonstrate the scope of circumstances that led to Japanese defeat, and how important they were overall. The conclusion reached by the essay is that, while loss of experienced Japanese combat pilots did contribute to Japanese defeat in the Pacific War, the overall impact was more of an accelerant of defeat, rather than a significant cause of defeat. There were too many more impactful factors that contributed to defeat for the loss of experienced combat pilots to be overall important.

With the advent of the Pacific War in 1941 came the strategic dominance of aircraft carriers, and the absolute power of the aircraft itself as a weapon of naval warfare. Recognizing this, the Japanese moved before the war to expand and develop their air force with the support of important military leaders such as Admiral Yamamoto, despite the opposition of conservative officers. With the combination of support from high command and combat experience garnered in China over the previous few years, Japanese planes and pilots entered the Pacific War with high potential[1], and the air force was an important part of almost all Japanese operations[2]. Thus, air supremacy was initially firmly in the hands of the Japanese. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), however, would not be able to maintain control of the air war.

Casualties are unavoidable in war, but the IJN was not prepared to replace their experienced, skilled combat pilots. Having a significantly smaller pool of pilots both trained and in training in the first place, critically flawed approaches to further training only further hindered the IJN’s efforts to keep the air force strong and well-stocked[3]. While the United States did not enter the war with pilots or planes equal in quality to their Japanese counterparts, the US did not suffer from the issues in manpower and training that the Japanese did. As the air war – and the whole war altogether – began to shift in favor of the United States, Japanese leaders such as Minoru Genda looked to explain the turn of events. In 1944, he found his answer to be that the recurring losses were due to lack of air superiority, which was in turn due to the defeat of Japanese pilots[4]. Pilots that had over the course of the war been increasingly replaced by inexperienced, ill-trained young men[5], further propagating the cycle.

However, there was far more than just poor-quality pilots at play. The IJN suffered from serious defects in many sectors, such as industry, infrastructure, design, and more. This paper tackles the question: to what extent did the loss of experienced combat pilots really contribute to Japanese defeat in the Pacific War? Ultimately, while the steady decline of combat ready pilots did much to hasten Japan’s defeat, it was not a decisive factor in the inevitable outcome.

While the bombing of Pearl Harbor December of 1941 was the first Japanese assault against the US, the majority of their efforts were focused on their southern advance towards the Philippines, French Indochina, and British Singapore where Japan would acquire the resources needed to continue building up her military forces. Here, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) employed tactics wherein certain key locations would be captured in order to build airstrips, from which their aircraft would keep the amphibious troop assaults under constant air cover[1]. Opposition to Japanese control of the seas and air was swiftly and efficiently dealt with by the infamous Zeros, whose reputation had been established a year earlier in China. A kill ratio of 12:1 in dogfights with Chinese fighters had given it a reputation as nearly invincible, and the Zeros clashes with the British would only cement its reputation. One particular battle with skilled English pilots over Sri Lanka in 1942 involved 36 Zeros against 60 British aircraft, with the outcome of 27 destroyed British craft and one defeated Zero.[2]

However, even this victory was unable to trump the crippling defeat that the Japanese had inflicted a few short months earlier on December 10^th, 1941. On this occasion two days after the first Japanese troops had landed in the Philippines, 98 Japanese planes took on Force Z, Britain’s ultimate naval force in the area. By the end of the battle, three Japanese planes had been destroyed and 28 damaged, but Force Z’s capital battleship “Prince of Wales” had been sunk, and the fleet crushed. Admiral Kondo, who led the Philippines invasion, did not need to directly involve a single ship of his fleet in the affair[3]. Japan’s victories were constant and continuous, and although American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDA) made efforts to hold back the Japanese, its actions were too late and resources too few to make an influential impact.

But why were the Japanese pilots so powerful? For one, they were experienced. By the time World War 2 officially began, the Japanese pilots were already veteran fighters, having fought over China for years.[4] Their experience generated a multitude of skills that contributed to the Japanese’ early aerial success. One of these skills was that the Japanese put emphasis on always being prepared and having positional advantage, as demonstrated by the experiences of US fighter pilot Captain Joseph P. Lynch. When recounting a dogfight he had with the Japanese during a fighter sweep of Kyushu in 1945 (at which point Japanese defeat was a scant few months away), he recalls “[…] it was the first time that I ever had altitude advantage in the entire war”[5](140). This predisposition for superior positioning and maneuvering is further supported by the Japanese’ talent at night fighting, and the use of what historian Trent Hone calls “… divided dispositions and dispersed formations.”[6]At night fighting in particular, the Japanese had much more practice than the Americans, and their lookouts proved on several occasions to have greater detection range than American radar.[7] The Japanese would use this to keep the playing field as level as possible as the war progressed, since it was particularly effective against American doctrine, which traditionally shunned night fighting and advocated mass-unit tactics.[8]

While the Japanese pilots were certainly experienced and skilled, it is also true that their famous Zero fighter was leaps and bounds ahead in quality compared to the dated fighters of the US and its allies[9], and that the ambushed Allied forces were in no way prepared to mount an effective resistance at the beginning of the war. For these reasons it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the veteran status of much of Japan’s pilots was actually responsible for Japan’s early victories. With the element of surprise and world-class planes like the Zero at their fingertips, could an air corps of rookie pilots have achieved the same results? If yes, then the experienced Japanese combat pilots may not have been very important to early Japanese success. If no, then the experienced pilots may have been more influential than this essay evaluates them to be. In any case, the sweeping advantages and stunning victories they had attained in the early air war guaranteed that Japan would continue to lean heavily on the capability of its air forces throughout the course of the Pacific War. To their detriment, however, time would tell that their overwhelming upper hand could not last.

Japan entered the war with undeniable advantages in the air, many of which it owed to its veteran pilots and advanced aircraft; however, these advantages were inevitably made null. Japanese policy was often at fault for the decline, particularly in the case of the veteran combat pilots, whose ultimate relevance this essay attempts to assess. Rather than cycling their experienced pilots off the front lines in order for them to serve as instructors to the next batch of pilots, the Japanese kept their airmen on the battlefield until they expired in battle. This resulted in not only a rapidly shrinking reserve of veteran pilots, but also a steep decline in the quality of newly trained ones.[1]

Aside from the lack of well-qualified instructors, increasingly scarce fuel supplies and a pressing demand for airmen prevented any new pilots from receiving thorough and proper training. Statistics vividly show the decline of the Japanese air forces in comparison to the US’ over the war. James P. Levy, an author for the Naval War College Review, wrote “By the winter of 1943-44 Japanese pilots were lucky to get 275 hours of flight training, while American pilots were not released to squadrons until they had 525 hours in the air.”[2] The effects of the hamstrung training was becoming increasingly apparent on the battlefield around this time, such as at the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944. By the end of the fight, 243 of Japan’s carrier aircraft were destroyed, and most of the pilots killed. Japan’s air arm was effectively defunct.[3]

The fact that Japan’s air forces were weakening, however, was old news by the time of the afore-mentioned Battle of the Philippine Sea. Perhaps the earliest sign of the IJN’s weakening air capability was during The Battle of the Coral Sea. Two of Japan’s fleet carriers, the Shokaku and the Zuikaku, had to go out of action following the battle due to direct damage to the carrier and loss of pilots and planes respectively. Had the fleet carriers not had to retreat, they would have participated in the critical Battle of Midway. While it is generally bad practice to hypothesize alternate outcomes of historical battles, Paul S. Dull of the Naval Institute and author of the acclaimed A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1941-1945 predicts that the absence of the Shokaku and Zuikaku “[…] could have denied Japan a huge victory at Midway.”[4] Shokaku and Zuikaku would have provided important flexibility and screening to the Japanese forces at Midway. A primary cause of defeat for the Japanese at Midway was that their limited resources were assigned in such a way that their carriers were left completely exposed and defenseless to American counterattack.[5] This was because Japanese carrier design was inefficient – carriers could not handle launching, recovering, or servicing planes at the same time, or even in quick succession. Once a Japanese carrier committed fighters to a task, the entire carrier was locked into the course of action[6]. Had the Shokaku and Zuikaku been present, the Japanese could have spared more fighters to CAP (Combat Air Patrol) and stood a greater chance of resisting the American aircraft assault.

At the same time that Japan was quickly falling behind the US in pilot quality, its very aircraft were losing ground on those of the US. The Zero had started the war as a top-notch modern fighter, but the state of war meant that every nation’s research & development (R&D) were in full-swing, and the Zero became obsolete much faster than could normally be expected. When the American Hellcat was introduced into the fray in 1943, the Zero was condemned to its fate as the inferior fighter of the Pacific. While the Zero’s exceptional maneuverability had made it an early war dominator, the US’ new, modern fighters were designed with counter-tactics in mind, such as avoiding tight dogfights, and the Zero’s maneuverability was now insufficient. Japan’s efforts to develop newer, better fighters for itself bore some fruit in the form of the Shiden Kai fighter. Unfortunately this land-based plane came too late and in too few numbers, and the obsolete Zero continued to make up the majority of Japan’s fighters for the remainder of the war.[7]

But the Zero’s legendary combat record was already being tarnished even before the US successfully developed their superior aircraft. In July 1942 during a mission to the Aleutian Islands near Alaska, petty officer Tadayoshi Koga’s Zero was hit by US fire and he subsequently crashed landed on Akutan Island, dying of a broken neck. In doing so, as historian Elizabeth Hanes points out, “Koga literally handed the Allies the keys to defeating Japan in the air, helping bring an end to World War II.”[8] Against Japanese doctrine, his wing mates decided not to immediately destroy his aircraft, and the US soon recovered Koga’s mostly intact Zero. The Zero was restored to working condition, analyzed, and experimented upon, and what the US’ R&D discovered did not bode well for Japan. Its structure played a role in the designs of the US’ new fighters, and several flaws in its design were found and exploited. In particular, it was discovered that the Zero could not roll to the right as quickly as it could to the left, and that its engine would often sputter when diving at high speeds. This information was distributed to the US’ pilots, and used liberally to great effect in dogfights.[9]

Based on this overview of the various reasons for and ways in which the Japanese air power atrophied, the overall importance of Japan’s veteran pilots becomes somewhat clearer. Once the element of surprise was lost, and the plane tech advantage nullified, Japan’s only advantage would be its skilled, veteran pilots. But as has been shown, Japan’s veteran pilots were a dying breed, and the rookies who took their place were in no state to competently take their spots – which was in and of itself a result of the lack of veteran pilots. As more and more experienced pilots died, only to be replaced by a dwindling supply of increasingly untrained rookies, so did Japan’s navy get pushed further and further back to its home-waters. This serves as adequate proof that there was a relationship between the loss of veteran pilots and Japan’s defeat, but it does not prove that it was the sole cause, even if one is to consider just airpower. For as was explained, the US did not merely reach the same level of quality in planes as Japan, they even surpassed it. Thus, while the loss of veteran pilots was certainly a large part of the decline of Japan’s air force, it was not necessarily of staggering import.

It is apparent that one of Japan’s greatest advantages in the early Pacific War – it’s airpower – gradually lost much ground to the US’ own, and that this loss was simultaneous to the overall turning of the war in favor of the US. Therefore, it is not overly difficult to comprehend why Minoru Genda would consider the aerial defeat to have been the direct cause of Japan’s defeat[1], but realistically there was more at work than just aerial inferiority when Japan lost the war.

Removed from the failing battle lines was a critically flawed strategic command system that pitted the two main branches of the Japanese military, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) against each other. This was due to a system in which the IJA and IJN prepared their own plans, without consulting each other unless explicitly necessary to execute a particular operation. The result, unsurprisingly, was a lack of national focus and inefficiencies in usage of already limited resources and effort. When the interests of the two branches conflicted, there was also a distinct lack of cooperation resulting in an inefficient use of Japan’s resources. Generally, the IJA used its greater political pull to veto the IJN’s plans, or otherwise create favorable outcomes for its goals.[2] Given that a war demands great amounts of cooperation, such a divisive atmosphere would certainly have aided in Japan’s defeat.

In addition to their already unfavorable working relationship, both the IJA and IJN suffered from multiple base defects: “[…] poor planning, a lack of interest in intelligence work, promotion by seniority rather than merit, poor control over field officers, and a culture that confused recklessness with bravery.”[3] Of all of these traits, poor planning deserves elaboration most, being particularly widespread and critical. Broadly, “The Japanese showed throughout the war that they lacked flexibility and were less effective when operating outside pre-established plans.”[4] More specifically, historian Hone Trent accuses the Japanese of “[…] inverting the priority of their strategic and tactical planning.”[5] What this means is that the Japanese first developed their tactical doctrine – the tactics used by their fleets in actual combat – and then created operations and grand strategies to accommodate the tactics. More simply, they created details, and then attempted to make a plan that could fit the details; Hone is stating that they should have instead first created a plan, and then made details to fit the plan. Other historians corroborate this Japanese flaw of prioritizing the details above all else. William L. O’Neill states that “[…] the navy favored attack plans that were too complex and depended on the enemy’s doing exactly what the Japanese expected,”[6] while Pelham G. Boyer simply judged the Japanese to have “[…] an inability to prioritize strategic options realistically.”[7]

The infamous attack on Pearl Harbor, led by Admiral Nagumo, Japan’s top carrier commander, serves as strong justification for the historians’ claims. Alan D. Zimm, revisionist historian and former Commander in the US Navy, has analyzed the planning of the attack thoroughly, and found it wanting. In his 2011 book Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions, Zimm outlines 21 specific mistakes on the part of the Japanese, all of which were the result of strategic and tactical failure. These mistakes include misallocation of firepower, leaving the bombers completely unescorted and vulnerable, and poorly planned flight paths. The results of said mistakes were that only three battleships were sunk, despite having more than enough firepower to sink six battleships and eight cruisers, what few anti-air (AA) guns and planes that were able to counter attack did so unopposed, and the attack took 11 minutes when it should have taken just one and a half.[8] Even worse, the Japanese neglected to damage the machine and repair shops, as well as the oil tank farms. These were critical targets, which would have grievously impaired Pearl Harbor’s usefulness as a naval base and extended the time the US navy needed to recover.[9] That the plans and tactics of Japan were so poor was definitely impactful on its eventual defeat.

Finally, Japan was at an enormous disadvantage from the very outset of the war simply because of their extremely limited resources and industrial potential. Incidentally, this was also the disadvantage that Japan was most self-aware of, and its officers made their initial plans based on this. Having calculated that the US was building “[…] three to five tons of warships for every ton coming out of Japanese yards […],”[10] at a time where Japan was preparing for war and the US itself was unaware of the impending attack, the Japanese planners knew that the only road to victory was one in which the Americans were beaten quickly. They would have to lure the American fleet into decisive battle early on, before the US production could get into full swing, and win an overwhelming victory after which the US would be compelled to negotiate a peace treaty with the Japanese.[11] The peace treaty was important to the Japanese because they intended to use it to ensure that they would retain the territories in the Pacific that they were invading simultaneously to their war with the US. These territories were important because they contained the vital resources that an empire would need – and Japan itself lacked.[12] But shortly before the plan went into action, Japan’s command personnel’s incapability to realistically judge strategic options interfered, and the whole production went awry. The plan changed, and the addition of the Pearl Harbor attack was the death sentence for Japan’s short-war route to victory. Why? Because if the Pearl Harbor attack succeeded in sinking a significant portion of the US fleet, the emaciated US navy would in no circumstances be willing to enter into decisive battle early. The US navy would wait, rebuild strength, and by the time the navy would be again willing to offer full battle the US’ production would be in full swing and Japan would have little hope of matching a fraction of the US’ strength.[13] And this is exactly what happened. The US “[…] with twice Japan’s population and ten times its gross national product […] far outstripped anything Japan could hope to match in terms of ships, planes, or trained personnel.”[14] With this disparity in national capabilities, it seems as if Japan’s defeat was pre-ordained ever since the Pearl Harbor attack. Even on its own, Japan’s disadvantage may have been enough to cause their defeat.

This paper attempted to answer the question: to what extent did the loss of experienced combat pilots contribute to Japanese defeat in the Pacific War?

While it is clear that the loss of experienced combat pilots was significant to the increasing trend of Japanese defeat in the air over the course of the war, this essay finds that any impact on Japan’s overall loss was negligible at best. Combat pilots, experienced or not, are but individual men, and while their impact in small sectors and engagements could be significant, a war consists of many greater factors beyond the scope of the frontlines. And of these greater factors, Japan was at the unarguable disadvantage.

With flawed command, flawed plans, and inadequate facilities and resources with which to supply war material, the nation of Japan itself was not in a position to wrench victory from the hands of any foe not caught completely off-guard – remember that Japan’s initial victories against the US, Britain, and other Allied countries occurred when Japan was on the offensive against foes who were in no position to mount effective defense.

As a closing remark, however, it should be said that this essay’s conclusions are worthy of questioning, as they directly conflict with the analysis of Minoru Genda, an experienced and respected Japanese military commander who served throughout the entirety of the war and afterwards. In his words, “[…] our battles were being lost because of defeats at sea. Defeat in battle was caused by the fact that we were overwhelmed in the air war. We were losing the air war because we had failed to secure air superiority with our fighters. In short, we were losing the war because our fighters were being defeated.”[1] While this paper’s author feels that Minoru Genda failed to consider the significant macro aspects of the war, the author would also acknowledge his overwhelming lack of military expertise and experience compared to Minoru Genda. For these reasons, further investigation may be needed on this topic.

Regardless, the research that went into this essay disagrees with Genda. This essay finds that Japanese defeat was all but assured from the beginning, and thus that Japan’s defeat was at best only expedited by the loss of the veteran combat pilots.

[1] Sakaida, Henry, and Toji Takaki. Genda's Blade: Japan's Squadron of Aces: 343 Kokutai. Hersham: Classic, 2003. Print.

[1] Sakaida, Henry, and Toji Takaki. Genda's Blade: Japan's Squadron of Aces: 343 Kokutai. Hersham: Classic, 2003. Print.

[2] Caravaggio, N, Angelo.. ""WINNING" THE PACIFIC WAR: The Masterful Strategy of Commander Minoru Genda." Naval War College Review1(2014):85. eLibrary. Web. 05 Dec. 2014.

[3] O'Neill, William L.. Japanese Navy. Oxford University Press, 1999. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[4] Zimm, D, Alan. "A STRATEGY HAS TO BE ABLE TO WORK TO BE MASTERFUL." Naval War College Review 1(2015):128. eLibrary. Web. 17 Jan. 2015.

[5] Hone, Trent. "U.S. NAVY SURFACE BATTLE DOCTRINE AND VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC." Naval War College Review 1(2009):67. eLibrary. Web. 18 Dec. 2014.

[6] O'Neill, William L.. Japanese Navy. Oxford University Press, 1999. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[7] Boyer, Pelham G. "FROM THE EDITORS." Naval War College Review 1(2014):3. eLibrary. Web. 18 Feb. 2015.

[8] Zimm, D, Alan. "A STRATEGY HAS TO BE ABLE TO WORK TO BE MASTERFUL." Naval War College Review 1(2015):128. eLibrary. Web. 17 Jan. 2015.

[9] Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1978. Print.

[10] Zimm, D, Alan. "A STRATEGY HAS TO BE ABLE TO WORK TO BE MASTERFUL." Naval War College Review 1(2015):128. eLibrary. Web. 17 Jan. 2015.

[11] Zimm, D, Alan. "A STRATEGY HAS TO BE ABLE TO WORK TO BE MASTERFUL." Naval War College Review 1(2015):128. eLibrary. Web. 17 Jan. 2015.

[12] Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1978. Print.

[13] Zimm, D, Alan. "A STRATEGY HAS TO BE ABLE TO WORK TO BE MASTERFUL." Naval War College Review 1(2015):128. eLibrary. Web. 17 Jan. 2015.

[14] Levy, P, James. "RACE FOR THE DECISIVE WEAPON: British, American, and Japanese Carrier Fleets, 1942-1943." Naval War College Review1(2005):136. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[1] O'Neill, William L.. Japanese Navy. Oxford University Press, 1999. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[2] Levy, P, James. "RACE FOR THE DECISIVE WEAPON: British, American, and Japanese Carrier Fleets, 1942-1943." Naval War College Review1(2005):136. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[3] O'Neill, William L.. Japanese Navy. Oxford University Press, 1999. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[4] Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1978. Print.

[5] Levy, P, James. "RACE FOR THE DECISIVE WEAPON: British, American, and Japanese Carrier Fleets, 1942-1943." Naval War College Review1(2005):136. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[6] Parshall, Jonathan B., Dickson, David D., Tully, Anthony P.. "Doctrine matters: Why the Japanese lost at Midway." Naval War College Review3(2001):139. eLibrary. Web. 18 Dec. 2014.

[7] Levy, P, James. "RACE FOR THE DECISIVE WEAPON: British, American, and Japanese Carrier Fleets, 1942-1943." Naval War College Review1(2005):136. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[8] Hanes, Elizabeth. "The Akutan Zero: How a Captured Japanese Fighter Plane Helped Win World War II." History.com. A&E Television Networks, 04 June 2012. Web. 16 Jan. 2015.

[9] Hanes, Elizabeth. "The Akutan Zero: How a Captured Japanese Fighter Plane Helped Win World War II." History.com. A&E Television Networks, 04 June 2012. Web. 16 Jan. 2015.

[1] Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1978. Print.

[2] Hanes, Elizabeth. "The Akutan Zero: How a Captured Japanese Fighter Plane Helped Win World War II." History.com. A&E Television Networks, 04 June 2012. Web. 16 Jan. 2015.

[3] Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1978. Print.

[4] O'Neill, William L.. Japanese Navy. Oxford University Press, 1999. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[5] Sakaida, Henry, and Toji Takaki. Genda's Blade: Japan's Squadron of Aces: 343 Kokutai. Hersham: Classic, 2003. Print.

[6] Hone, Trent. "U.S. NAVY SURFACE BATTLE DOCTRINE AND VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC." Naval War College Review 1(2009):67. eLibrary. Web. 18 Dec. 2014.

[7] Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1978. Print.

[8] Hone, Trent. "U.S. NAVY SURFACE BATTLE DOCTRINE AND VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC." Naval War College Review 1(2009):67. eLibrary. Web. 18 Dec. 2014.

[9] Hanes, Elizabeth. "The Akutan Zero: How a Captured Japanese Fighter Plane Helped Win World War II." History.com. A&E Television Networks, 04 June 2012. Web. 16 Jan. 2015.

[1] O'Neill, William L.. Japanese Navy. Oxford University Press, 1999. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[2] Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1978. Print.

[3] Levy, P, James. "RACE FOR THE DECISIVE WEAPON: British, American, and Japanese Carrier Fleets, 1942-1943." Naval War College Review1(2005):136. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[4] Sakaida, Henry, and Toji Takaki. Genda's Blade: Japan's Squadron of Aces: 343 Kokutai. Hersham: Classic, 2003. Print.

[5] Levy, P, James. "RACE FOR THE DECISIVE WEAPON: British, American, and Japanese Carrier Fleets, 1942-1943." Naval War College Review1(2005):136. eLibrary. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

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