インテリジェンスを扱う専門機関は情報機関と呼ばれる。例としてアメリカ中央情報局(CIA; Central Intelligence Agency)やイギリス秘密情報部(MI6; Military Intelligence 6th)、日本では内閣情報調査室(CIRO; Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office)がある(参考: 情報機関の一覧)。組織間の連携組織をインテリジェンス・コミュニティーという。
^"intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information ... 2. The activities that result in the product. 3. The organizations engaged in such activities." アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^ ab"Military and naval intelligence comprises the gathering, evaluation, and dissemination of information regarding enemy strength ,capabilities, and intentions required for combat operations." 米国戦略爆撃調査団. (1946). Japanese military and naval intelligence division. U.S. Government Printing Office.
^"日本ではスパイ、盗聴、暗殺といった物騒なイメージが先行しているのだが、あまりにインテリジェンスを狭く解釈している" p.ⅲ of of 北岡. (2009). インテリジェンス入門 第2版. 慶応義塾大学出版会.
^"It is therefore important that intelligence analysts communicate the degree of confidence they have in their analytic conclusions. Such communication of analytic confidence helps intelligence consumers in deciding how much weight to place on intelligence assessments when making a decision. " アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^"One methodology intelligence personnel may use to assign a confidence level to their analytic conclusions or intelligence assessments is discussed in Appendix A, “Intelligence Confidence Levels in Analytic Judgments.” ... Confidence levels are stated as Low, Moderate, and High." アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^"It draws on the complementary strengths of all intelligence disciplines ... All-source, fused intelligence results in a finished intelligence product that provides the most accurate and complete picture possible of what is known about an activity." p.Ⅱ_12 of アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^"あるインフォメーションやインテリジェンスを他のインフォメーションやインテリジェンスと付き合わせると、当初のインフォメーションやインテリジェンスでは分からなかったことが、分かるようになることがある。これを「収集の相乗効果」という。" p.174 of 北岡. (2008). インテリジェンス入門 -利益を実現する知識の創造-. 第2版. 慶応義塾大学出版会.
^"fusion. In intelligence usage, the process of managing information to conduct all-source analysis and derive a complete assessment of activity." p.GL_7 of アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^"Fusion is a deliberate and consistent process of collecting and examining information from all available sources and intelligence disciplines to derive as complete an assessment as possible of detected activity." p.Ⅱ_12 of アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^"analysis and production is done primarily by all-source analysts that fuse together information from all intelligence disciplines. The product of multidiscipline fusion effort is all-source intelligence." アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^"「ストーブパイプス」(文字通り「ストーブの煙突」の複数形)... 異なったインテリジェンスにつき、リクワイアメント伝達からインテリジェンス配布までのプロセスが、あたかもストーブの煙突のように閉じており、相互に連絡がない、もしくは連絡が悪いことを「ストーブパイプス」と呼ぶ" pp.194-195 of 北岡. (2008). インテリジェンス入門 -利益を実現する知識の創造-. 第2版. 慶応義塾大学出版会.
^"Operation Bodenplatte ... the 12th Army Group Headquarters ... had received adequate ... SIGINT ... and human intelligence reporting to have provided tactical warning ... The reports, however, had not been fused. Highly compartmented SIGINT ... received before the German attack ... However, the SIGINT specialist had no further knowledge regarding this operation or what it entailed. Filed elsewhere in the headquarters, a prisoner of war interrogation report of a former Luftwaffe clerk in Berlin described aspects of Operation Bodenplatte ... This stove-piped compartmentalization ... resulted in the unnecessary destruction of several hundred Allied aircraft." p.Ⅱ_12 of アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^"course of action — 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. Also called COA." p.GL_7 of アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2020). Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Planning.
^"Predictive analysis is both difficult and risky (i.e., it challenges the intellectual resources of the analyst while at the same time entailing considerable risk that the events predicted may not come to pass)." p.Ⅱ_10 of アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^"Predictive analysis is riskier ... because it deals more extensively with dynamic adversary characteristics, a greater range of unknown factors, and possibly enemy deception plans." p.Ⅱ_10 of アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^"When justified by the available evidence, intelligence should forecast future" "overly cautious intelligence personnel to avoid predictive analysis. However ... The analyst who successfully performs predictive analysis ... performs an invaluable service to the commander and staff."
p.Ⅱ_9-10 of アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^"If there is inadequate information upon which to base forecasts, the intelligence staff must ensure that the commander is aware of this shortcoming and that the future contains much uncertainty" p.Ⅱ_9 of アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.
^"JFCs must understand that intelligence predictions are only estimates and that they accept an amount of risk in formulating plans based only on ... most probable COA." p.Ⅱ_10 of アメリカ統合参謀本部. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0 Joint Intelligence.