Of these, Lord Salisbury, Count de Chaudordy and Baron von Calice were Ambassadors Plenipotentiary to the conference, while Count Ignatyev, Sir Henry Elliot, Count de Bourgoing, Baron von Werther, Count Zichy and Count Corti were the resident Ambassadors of their countries in Constantinople.
Midhat Pasha was the Grand Vizier (First Minister), and Saffet Pasha the Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire. Although the Ottoman representatives participated in the plenaries of the conference, they were not invited to the preceding working sessions at which the Great Powers negotiated and elaborated their agreement.
Lord Salisbury and Count Ignatyev played a leading role in the process. Ignatyev was trying to dispel British misgivings about Russia's assumed role of a protector of the Eastern OrthodoxSlavs being but a disguise of its drive to take over the Black Sea Straits and Constantinople itself and thus – as Prime Minister Disraeli feared – potentially threaten the vital Mediterranean routes to British India via the Suez Canal, completed in 1869.[6] On his part, Salisbury saw the conference as a promising opportunity for mapping out a comprehensive deal with Russia over their conflicting territorial ambitions in Central Asia.[7]
The Great Powers agreed on a substantial Bulgarian autonomy to take the form of two new Ottoman provinces (vilayets) established for the purpose: Eastern, with capital Tarnovo, and Western, with capital Sofia.[9][10]
The conference determined that, as of the late 19th century, the Bulgarian ethnic territories within the Ottoman Empire extended to Tulcea and the Danube Delta in the northeast, Ohrid and Kastoria in the southwest, Kirklareli and Edirne in the southeast, and Leskovac and Niš in the northwest. These territories were to be incorporated into the two Bulgarian autonomous provinces as follows:
The agreed decisions of the six Great Powers were formally handed over to the Ottoman Government on 23 December 1876,[12] dismissing the opening Ottoman suggestions that the Conference's mission might be unnecessary, given a new Ottoman Constitution approved by SultanAbdul Hamid II that same day.[13] In the subsequent conference's plenary sessions, the Ottoman Empire submitted objections and alternative reform proposals that were rejected by the Great Powers, and attempts to bridge the gap did not succeed.[14] Eventually, on 18 January 1877 Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha announced the definitive refusal of the Ottoman Empire to accept the conference decisions.[9]
Legacy
The rejection by the Ottoman Government of the decisions of the Constantinople Conference triggered the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War, depriving at the same time the Ottoman Empire – in contrast to the preceding 1853–1856 Crimean War – of Western support.[9]
Bulgarian historiography treats the conference as the most reliable international evidence for the Bulgarian character of the local Slavic population of Macedonia due to the fact that the Ottoman Empire and the 6 European Great Powers, regardless of the differences in their geopolitical interests, recognized the majority of the area as such with a predominantly Bulgarian population, although the April Uprising, which drew international attention to the Bulgarian national question, hardly broke out in Macedonia.[16]
^ abcdConference de Constantinople. Reunions Préliminaires. Compte rendu No. 8. Scéance du 21 décembre 1876. Annexe III Bulgare. Règlement organique. (in French)
^ abFurther Correspondence respecting the affairs of Turkey. (With Maps of proposed Bulgarian Vilayets). Parliamentary Papers No 13 (1877).
^Correspondence respecting the Conference at Constantinople and the affairs of Turkey: 1876–1877. Parliamentary Papers No 2 (1877). p. 140.
^L.S. Stavrianos. Constantinople Conference, in: The Balkans Since 1453. Austin: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963.
R.W. Seton-Watson. Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1972. p. 108. ISBN978-0-393-00594-3