This article is about the state of Qin under the Zhou dynasty. For the empire that it controlled after the fall of the Zhou, see Qin dynasty. For other states of this name, see Qin § Dynasties and states.
Qin (/tʃɪn/, or Ch'in[1]) was an ancient Chinese state during the Zhou dynasty. It is traditionally dated to 897 BC.[2] The Qin state originated from a reconquest of western lands that had previously been lost to the Xirong. Its location at the western edge of Chinese civilisation allowed for expansion and development that was not available to its rivals in the North China Plain.
After extensive reform during the 4th century BC, Qin emerged as one of the dominant powers among the Seven Warring States. It unified the seven states of China in 221 BC under Qin Shi Huang. This unification established the Qin dynasty, which, despite its short duration, had a significant influence on later Chinese history. Accordingly, the Qin state before the Qin dynasty was established is also referred to as the "predynastic Qin"[3][4] or "proto-Qin".[5]
The western Ying clan at Quanqiu were lords over the Xichui ('western march') region west of Mount Long and served as a buffer state for the Shang dynasty against invasions by the Xirong barbarians. One of them, Elai, was killed defending King Zhou of Shang during the rebellion led by Ji Fa that established the Zhou dynasty. The Ying clan was, however, allied with the politically influential marquesses of Shen, whom the Zhou monarch relied upon heavily to manage the Rong people and was thus allowed to retain their lands and continued serving as an attached vassal under the Zhou dynasty. Feizi, a younger son of Elai's fourth-generation descendant Daluo, impressed King Xiao of Zhou so much with his horse breeding skills, that he was awarded a separate fief in the valley of Qin (modern Qingshui and Zhangjiachuan in Gansu) northeast of Quanqiu, and his seat was named Qinyi (modern Qintingzhen). Both branches of the western Ying clan lived in the midst of the Rong tribes, sometimes fighting their armies and sometimes intermarrying with their kings.[6][8]
Scholars such as Annette Juliano and Arthur Cotterel have suggested that having a horse-breeder as their ancestor may imply that the Ying family had a partial connection to nomadic tribes. As late as 266 BC, it was remarked by a noble of Wei that they shared customs with the Rong and Beidi tribes; the central plains states seemed to hold Qin culture and other peripheral states like Yan and Chu in low regard, due to the marginal location of their states. Qin was the second state after Zhao to adopt cavalry tactics from the nomads. Following the collapse of the Zhou dynasty, the Qin state absorbed cultures from two of the Four Barbarians from the west and north, which made the other warring states see their culture in low esteem.[9][10] However, the Qin state was sensitive to the cultural discrimination by the Central Plains states and attempted to assert their Huaxia identity. In Qin law, mixed-ethnicity offspring were categorised as Huaxia, as well as in their preference for importing recruits from the neighbouring state of Jin.[11]
In 842 BC, nobles revolted against the corrupt King Li of Zhou in a coup known as the 'countrymen's riot' (國人暴動). They overthrew him the following year, leading the country into political turmoil. The Xirong tribes seized this opportunity to rebel against the Zhou dynasty, attacking and exterminating the senior branch of the Ying clan at Quanqiu. This left the cadet branch at Qinyi as the only surviving Ying clan in the west.
After King Xuan of Zhou ascended the throne in 827 BC, he appointed Qin Zhong, Feizi's great-grandson, as the commander of his forces in the campaign against the Xirong. In 822 BC, Qin Zhong was killed in battle and succeeded by his eldest son, Duke Zhuang. To commemorate Qin Zhong's loyalty, King Xuan summoned Duke Zhuang and his four younger brothers and gave them 7,000 soldiers. The Qin brothers successfully defeated the Rong and recovered their lost patrimony, formerly held by the deceased branch of the Ying clan. King Xuan formally awarded them the territory of Quanqiu. Duke Zhuang then moved his seat from Qinyi to Quanqiu and had three sons.
When Duke Zhuang died in 778 BC, his eldest son Shifu chose to continue fighting the Xirong and avenge their grandfather, turning down the succession. As a result, his second son, Duke Xiang, ascended as the clan leader. In 777 BC, Duke Xiang married his younger sister, Mu Ying, to a Rong leader named King Feng (豐王) in an apparent attempt to make peace. The following year, he moved the Qin capital eastward from Quanqiu to Qian (汧; modern Long County, Shaanxi). However, Quanqiu soon fell to the Rong again after he left. His older brother Shifu, who led the defense of Quanqiu, was captured by the Rong but was released a year later.
In 771, the Marquess of Shen, in collaboration with the state of Zeng and the Quanrong nomads, attacked and sacked the Zhou capital Haojing, killing King You of Zhou and ending the Western Zhou. Duke Xiang led his troops to escort King You's son, King Ping, to Luoyi (modern Luoyang), where the new capital city of the Eastern Zhou dynasty was established. In gratitude for Duke Xiang's service, King Ping formally enfeoffed Duke Xiang as a feudal lord and elevated Qin from an 'attached state' (附庸; fùyōng, a minor state with limited self-rule under the authority of another liege-lord) to a major vassal state with full autonomy. He further promised to permanently grant Qin the lands west of Qishan, the former heartland of Zhou, if Qin could expel the Rong tribes that were occupying it. Encouraged by this promise, the following generations of Qin rulers launched several military campaigns against the Rong, eventually expanding their territories far beyond the original lands lost by the Western Zhou dynasty.[6][12] The Qin state therefore viewed the Zhou rulers King Wen and Wu as their predecessors and themselves as the legitimate inheritors of their legacy.[13]
Spring and Autumn period
During the Spring and Autumn period (722–481 BC), the Qin state's interaction with other central Chinese states remained minimal due to their primary concern with the Rong to the west. The exception was their immediate eastern neighbor, Jin, a large vassal of the Zhou. Qin maintained diplomatic relations with Jin through intermarriages between the royal clans, but relations occasionally deteriorated to the point of armed conflict.
In the early reign of Duke Mu of Qin, the Jin state, under the leadership of Duke Xian of Jin, was a formidable power. However, after Duke Xian's death, Jin descended into internal conflict as Duke Xian's sons fought for succession. Duke Hui of Jin, one of the contenders, emerged victorious. However, Jin was struck by a famine in 647 BC, and Duke Hui requested aid from Qin. Duke Mu of Qin, married to Duke Hui's half-sister, sent relief food supplies and agricultural equipment to Jin out of goodwill. However, when Qin experienced a famine the following year, Duke Hui did not reciprocate, leading to diplomatic deterioration and a war in 645 BC. The war ended with Duke Hui's defeat and capture, but Duke Mu later released him after Jin agreed to cede land and form an alliance.
During the battles with Jin, Duke Mu learned that Chong'er, one of Duke Xian's exiled sons, was taking refuge in the state of Chu. After consulting his subjects, Duke Mu sent an emissary to Chu to invite Chong'er and supported him in his challenge against his brother, Duke Hui. After Chong'er defeated Duke Hui to become Duke Wen of Jin, he expressed gratitude to Duke Mu, and relations between the two states improved. With stability on his eastern front, Duke Mu seized the opportunity to launch military campaigns against the Rong tribes in the west.
In 630 BC, Qin and Jin agreed to wage war on the state of Zheng, but Duke Mu was lobbied by the Zheng emissary to abandon the alliance. In 627 BC, Duke Mu planned a covert attack on Zheng, but the Qin army retreated after being deceived into believing that Zheng was already prepared for Qin's invasion. By that point, Duke Wen had died and his personal alliance with Duke Mu no longer stood, and his successor Duke Xiang ordered an ambush for the retreating Qin army. The Qin forces were defeated at the Battle of Xiao (near modern Luoning County, Henan) and suffered heavy casualties, and all three of its generals were captured. Three years later, Qin attacked Jin for revenge and achieved a major victory. Duke Mu refused to advance further east after holding a memorial service for those killed in action at the Battle of Xiao and returned to focus on the traditional policy of expanding Qin's dominance in the west. Duke Mu's achievements in Qin's western campaigns and his handling of foreign relations with Jin earned him a position among the Five Hegemons of the Spring and Autumn period.
In a speech pronounced on the eve of a major interstate conference of 546 BC, a Jin leader recognized Qin, along with Jin, Chu and Qi, as one of the four pivotal great powers of the current world.[16]
In 506 BC, King Helü of Wu defeated Chu at the Battle of Boju and captured the Chu capital, Ying (modern Jingzhou). Helü's adviser, Wu Zixu, who had previously been forced into exile by the already deceased King Ping of Chu and craved vengeance for the brutal execution of his father and brother, exhumed King Ping's corpse and posthumously lashed it. This was a great humiliation for the Chu state. Consequently, Shen Baoxu, a Chu official and a former friend of Wu Zixu, travelled to the Qin court and pleaded for assistance from Duke Ai of Qin to recover the capital. After Duke Ai initially refused to help, Shen spent seven days crying in the palace courtyard. Duke Ai was eventually moved by his devotion and agreed to send troops to assist Chu. The famous poem, "No Clothes" (Chinese: 無衣; pinyin: Wú Yī), recorded in the Classic of Poetry, was a battle hymn personally composed by Duke Ai to boost the morale of the Qin troops. In 505 BC, the Qin and Chu armies jointly defeated Wu in several battles, allowing King Zhao of Chu to be restored and return to the recaptured capital.
Warring States Period
Early non-involvement
Mozi (460–390 BC) did not list Qin among the powerful states.[17] However, other scattered information of its military exploits indicates that Qin remained a powerful polity ever since Lord Mu. Its armies acted, even if infrequently, in the eastern and southeastern parts of the Chinese world, occasionally against great power Wu. Although not weak, the overall impact of Qin on the affairs of the Zhou world in the 5th and the early 4th century BC considerably diminished.[18] Another research also finds that Qin was strong and explains the weak influence on the Central Plain by the Qin isolationist policy. Initially, Qin avoided involvement using its protective geography and, responding to growing external threats, gradually turned to intervention in the manner of "defensive imperialism."[19]
In 362 BC, Qin defeated Wei and Han.[20] Following these victories, the Qin rulers actively pursued legal, economic, and social reforms. In 361 BC, Duke Xiao ascended the throne of Qin. He issued an announcement inviting men of talent (including scholars, administrators, theorists, and militarists) from other states to enter Qin and assist him with his reforms, promising rewards of high offices and lands in return.
Among these foreign talents, Shang Yang successfully conducted a series of Legalist reforms in Qin with the support of Duke Xiao, despite facing strong opposition from conservative Qin politicians. Direct primogeniture was abolished, with all commoners granted citizenship rights. Many were resettled in new clusters with a focus on increasing agricultural output. Meritocracy was practiced throughout, especially in the military, with soldiers and officers receiving due rewards according to their contributions, regardless of their backgrounds. However, stringent and strict laws were also imposed, with severe punishments being meted out for the slightest of offences, and even the nobility and royalty were not exempt. After decades, the reforms strengthened Qin economically and militarily, and transformed it into a highly centralised state with an efficient administrative system.
Following the death of Duke Xiao, King Huiwen ascended as the new ruler of Qin. He executed Shang Yang by tearing him apart with chariots, citing charges of treason. However, some speculated that the king harboured a personal grudge against Shang, as he had been severely punished for a minor infraction during his adolescence under Shang's reformed system. Despite this, King Huiwen and his successors maintained the reformed systems, which laid the foundation for Qin's eventual unification of China under the Qin dynasty in 221 BC. Shang Yang's theories were later expanded upon by Han Fei, another Legalist scholar. Han Fei amalgamated Shang's ideas with those of Shen Buhai and Shen Dao, forming the core philosophies of Legalism. Following these reforms, Qin rose to prominence in the late fourth century BC and emerged as the dominant superpower among the Seven Warring States.
Hegemonic stage
In 364 BC, Qin defeated the combined armies of Wei and Han, and King Xian of Zhou, the nominal ruler of China, declared Duke Xian the Hegemon (ba) of China (Sima Qian 4:160). His successor, Duke Xiao, who ascended the throne in 361 BC, was also appointed Hegemon (Sima Qian 7:203). The Guanzi defines the status of hegemon as intermediate between king and emperor.[25] A text from the late Warring States period describes hegemon as controlling military forces and commerce of the states under the hegemony and using court visits as a means of supervision.[26]
After Xiao, the status of hegemon was not officially granted to the kings of Qin, but de facto Qin remained hegemonic until its universal conquest in 221 BC. It seldom suffered defeats and repeatedly crashed other states in at least 15 major campaigns. Memorial on the Abolition of Feudal Lords by Qin official Li Si, dated to 246 BC,[27] described: Through military victories, Qin has, "in the time of the last six kings," that is from Xiao in 361 BC to the First Emperor, brought the other states "into submission." Already by the 240s BC, other states "yielded obeiscence to Qin as if they were its commanderies and prefectures."[28] Sima Qian (6:282) confirmed and dated the beginning of the Qin hegemonic policy already from the reign of Xiao's predecessor, Xian (384-361 BC): Since his reign, Qin "gradually swallowed up the six states until, after 100 years or so," the First Emperor conquered them. "For more than one hundred years [before 221 BC], Qin commanded Eight lands and brought the lords of equal rank to its court."[29]
By the late 4th century BC, other states in China became alarmed by the Qin power and began forming anti-hegemonic alliances, called Perpendicular (Sima Qian 5:208; 6:279).[30][31] Qin repeatedly clashed with these alliances. This pattern continued during the last century of the Warring States.
The success of Qin is attributed to the industriousness of its people. The Qin kings authorised numerous state development projects, including significant public works such as irrigation canals and defensive structures.
One of the most evident outcomes of the reforms was the transformation in Qin's military. Previously, the army was under the control of Qin's nobles and comprised feudal levies. Following Shang Yang's reforms, the aristocracy system was abolished and replaced by a meritocracy, in which ordinary citizens had the same opportunities as the nobles to be promoted to high ranks. Additionally, military discipline was strictly enforced, and the troops were trained to adapt more effectively to various battle situations. Qin's military strength increased significantly with the full support of the state. In 318 BC, the states of Wei, Zhao, Han, Yan, and Chu formed an alliance and attacked Qin, but failed to advance beyond Hangu Pass, and were defeated by counter-attacking Qin forces. The alliance crumbled due to mistrust, suspicion, and a lack of coordination among the five states.[citation needed]
In addition to the effects on Qin's military, Shang Yang's reforms also increased labour for numerous public works projects aimed at enhancing agriculture, and enabled Qin to maintain and supply an active military force of more than a million troops.[citation needed] This achievement could not be matched by any other state, except Chu, during that time. Qin's conquests of the southern states of Ba and Shu (modern Sichuan) also provided Qin with significant strategic advantages. The lands in the new territories were highly fertile and served as a "backyard" for supplies and additional manpower. It was difficult for Qin's rivals to attack Ba and Shu, as the territories were located deep in the mountains upstream of the Yangtze. Simultaneously, Qin's strategic position in Ba and Shu provided it with a platform for launching attacks on the Chu state, which lies downstream of the Yangtze.
Qin conquered Qi and unified China under the Qin dynasty
During the reign of King Huiwen of Qin, the state of Chu to the southeast became a target for Qin's aggression. Although Chu had the largest operation-ready army of all the Seven Warring States at over a million troops,[citation needed] its administrative and military strength was plagued by corruption and divided among the nobles. The Qin strategist Zhang Yi suggested to King Huiwen to exercise Qin's interest at the expense of Chu. Over the following years, Zhang engineered and executed a number of diplomatic plots against Chu, supported by the constant military raids on Chu's north-western border. Chu suffered many defeats in battles against Qin and was forced to cede territories to Qin. King Huai I of Chu was furious and ordered a military campaign against Qin, but he was tricked by Zhang Yi into breaking diplomatic ties with his allies, and his angered allies joined Qin in inflicting a crushing defeat on Chu. In 299 BC, King Huai I was tricked into attending a diplomatic conference in Qin, where he was captured and held hostage until his death. In the meantime, Qin launched several attacks on Chu and eventually sacked the Chu capital city of Chen (陳; modern Jiangling County, Hubei). The crown prince of Chu fled east and was crowned King Qingxiang of Chu in the new capital city of Shouchun (壽春; modern Shou County, Anhui).
In the five decades following King Huiwen's death, King Zhaoxiang of Qin shifted his focus to the central plains after victories in the south against Chu. In the early years of King Zhaoxiang's reign, the Marquis of Rang (穰侯) served as Qin's chancellor and actively advocated for military campaigns against the state of Qi in the far eastern part of China. However, the marquis had personal motives, intending to use Qin's formidable military to secure his own fief in Qi territories, as these lands were not directly linked to Qin and would not be under the Qin government's direct administration.
King Zhaoxiang's foreign adviser, Fan Sui, counselled the king to abandon these fruitless campaigns against distant states. King Zhaoxiang heeded this advice and altered Qin's foreign policy to foster good diplomatic relations with the distant states of Yan and Qi), while focusing on attacking the nearby Zhao, Han, and Wei. As a result, Qin began to launch constant attacks on Han and Wei over the subsequent decades, conquering several territories in its campaigns. By then, Qin's territories had expanded beyond the eastern shore of the Yellow River, and Han and Wei were reduced to the status of "buffers" for Qin against the other states in the east.
Starting from 265 BC, Qin launched a massive invasion on Han and forced Han to cede its territory of Shangdang (上黨; modern Shanxi). However, Han offered Shangdang to Zhao instead, leading to a conflict between Qin and Zhao for control of Shangdang. Qin and Zhao engaged in the three-year-long Battle of Changping, followed by another three-year siege by Qin on Zhao's capital city of Handan. The conflict at Changping was seen as a power struggle, as both sides pitted their forces against each other not only on the battlefield, but also domestically. Although Qin had an abundance of resources and vast manpower, it had to enlist every man above the age of 15 for war-related duties, ranging from front-line service to logistics and agriculture. King Zhaoxiang even personally directed his army's supply lines. Qin's eventual victory in 260 BC was attributed to its use of schemes to stir up internal conflict in Zhao, which led to the replacement of Zhao's military leaders.
Following the Qin victory at the Battle of Changping, the Qin commander, Bai Qi, ordered the 400,000 prisoners of war from Zhao to be executed by burying them alive. Subsequently, the Qin forces marched on the Zhao capital city of Handan in an attempt to conquer Zhao completely. However, the Qin troops were unable to capture Handan as they were already exhausted and also because the Zhao forces put up fierce resistance. King Xiaocheng of Zhao offered six cities to Qin as a peace offer, and King Zhaoxiang of Qin accepted the offer after being persuaded by Fan Sui. Within Zhao, many officials strongly opposed King Xiaocheng's decision to give up the cities, and subsequent delays caused the siege on Handan to be prolonged until 258 BC. Meanwhile, Bai Qi was consecutively replaced by Wang Xi, Wang Ling, and Zheng Anping as the Qin commander at the siege.
In 257 BC, Qin was still unable to penetrate Handan after besieging it for three years, and Zhao requested aid from the neighbouring states of Wei and Chu. Wei was hesitant to help Zhao initially but launched an attack on Qin after seeing that Qin was already exhausted after years of war. The Qin forces crumbled and retreated, and Zheng Anping surrendered. The combined forces of Wei and Chu continued to pursue the retreating Qin army, and Wei managed to retake part of its original lands that were lost to Qin earlier.
Infrastructural works
In the middle of the 3rd century, Zheng Guo, a hydraulic engineer from the state of Han, was dispatched to Qin to advise King Zhaoxiang on the construction of irrigation canals. Qin had a predilection for constructing large-scale canals, as evidenced by its irrigation system for the Min River. King Zhaoxiang approved Zheng Guo's proposal to construct an even larger canal. The project was completed in 264 and the canal was named in honour of Zheng. Qin benefited from the project as it became one of the most fertile states in China due to the efficient irrigation system, and also because it could now muster more troops as a result of increased agricultural yield.
In 247, the 13-year-old Ying Zheng became King of Qin following the sudden death of King Zhuangxiang. However, Ying Zheng did not fully wield state power until 238, after eliminating his political rivals, Lü Buwei and Lao Ai. Ying formulated a plan for conquering the other six states and unifying China, with assistance from Li Si and Wei Liao.
In 230, Qin attacked Han, the weakest of the Seven Warring States, and succeeded in conquering Han within a year. Since 236, Qin had been launching several assaults on Zhao, which had been devastated by its calamitous defeat at the Battle of Changping three decades earlier. Although Qin faced strong resistance from the Zhao forces, led by General Li Mu, it still managed to defeat the Zhao army by using a ploy to sow discord between King Qian of Zhao and Li Mu, leading King Qian to order Li Mu's execution and replace Li with the less competent Zhao Cong. Zhao eventually fell to Qin in 228 after the capital city of Handan was taken. However, a Zhao noble managed to escape with remnant forces and proclaim himself King in Dai. Dai fell to Qin six years later.
After the fall of Zhao, Qin turned its attention towards Crown Prince Dan of Yan, who had sent Jing Ke to assassinate Ying Zheng, but the assassination attempt failed, and Qin used that as a pretext to attack Yan. Yan lost to Qin at a battle on the eastern bank of the Yi River in 226, and King Xi of Yan fled with remnant forces to Liaodong. Qin attacked Yan again in 222 and annexed Yan completely. In 225, the Qin army, led by Wang Ben, invaded Wei and besieged Wei's capital city of Daliang for three months. Wang directed the waters from the Yellow River and the Hong Canal to flood Daliang; King Jia of Wei surrendered, and Wei was conquered.
In 224, Qin prepared for an attack on Chu, its most powerful rival among the six states. During a discussion between Ying Zheng and his subjects, the veteran general Wang Jian claimed that the invasion force needed to be at least 600,000 strong, but the younger general Li Xin thought that 200,000 men would suffice. Ying Zheng put Li Xin in command of the Qin army to attack Chu. The Chu defenders, led by Xiang Yan, took Li Xin's army by surprise and defeated the Qin invaders. The defeat was deemed the greatest setback for Qin in its wars to unify China. Ying Zheng put Wang Jian in command of the 600,000-strong army as he had requested and ordered Wang to lead another attack on Chu. Wang scored a major victory against the Chu forces in 224, and Xiang Yan was killed in action. The following year, Qin pushed on and captured Chu's capital city of Shouchun, bringing an end to Chu's existence. In 222, the Qin army advanced southward and annexed the Wuyue region (modern Zhejiang and Jiangsu).
By 221, Qi was the only rival state left. Qin advanced into the heartland of Qi via a southern detour, avoiding direct confrontation with the Qi forces on Qi's western border and arrived swiftly at Qi's capital city of Linzi. The Qi forces were taken by surprise and surrendered without putting up resistance. Following the fall of Qi in 221 BC, China was unified under the rule of Qin. Ying Zheng declared himself "Qin Shi Huang" (meaning "First Emperor of Qin"), founded the Qin dynasty, and became the first sovereign ruler of a united China.
Culture and society
Before Qin unified China, each state had its own customs and culture. According to the Yu Gong or Tribute of Yu, composed in the 4th or 5th century BC and included in the Book of Documents, there were nine distinct cultural regions of China, which are described in detail in this book. The work focuses on the travels of the titular sage, Yu the Great, throughout each of the regions. Other texts, predominantly military, also discussed these cultural variations.[32]
One of these texts was the Wuzi, written in response to a query by Marquis Wu of Wei on how to cope with the military threat posed by competing states. Wu Qi, the author of the work, declared that the government and nature of the people were reflective of the terrain they live in. Of Qin, he said:
The nature of Qin's troops is to disperse so that each unit fights their own respective battles.
The people of Qin are ferocious by nature and their terrain is treacherous. The government's decrees are strict and impartial. The rewards and punishments are clear. Qin soldiers are brave and high in morale so that they are able to scatter and engage in individual combat. To strike at Qin's army, we must entice various groups with small benefits; the greedy will abandon their general to give chase. We can then capitalize on this opportunity by hunting each group down individually and then capturing the generals that have been isolated. Finally, we must array our army to ambush their commander.
— Wuzi
According to Wu, the character of the populace is a consequence of the government, which in turn is a result of the ruggedness of the terrain. Wu expounds upon each of the states in this manner.[33]
Following a visit to Qin in 264, the Confucian philosopher Xun Kuang observed that Qin society was "simple and unsophisticated", and its people held their officials in awe but were entirely devoid of Confucian literati.[34] Despite being disliked by many Confucians of its time for "dangerously lacking in Confucian scholars", Confucian Xun Kuang wrote of the later Qin that "its topographical features are inherently advantageous", and that its "manifold natural resources gave it remarkable inherent strength. Its people were unspoiled and exceedingly deferential; its officers unfailingly respectful, earnest, reverential, loyal, and trustworthy; and its high officials public-spirited, intelligent, and assiduous in the execution of the duties of their position. Its courts and bureaus functioned without delays and with such smoothness that it was as if there were no government at all."[35]
In his Petition against driving away foreigners (諫逐客書), Li Si mentioned that the guzheng and percussion instruments made of pottery and tiles were characteristic of Qin music.
^Zhixin Sun (2017). Age of Empires: Art of the Qin and Han Dynasties. Metropolitan Museum of Art. p. 33. ISBN9781588396174.
^Lothar von Falkenhausen (2006). Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC). Cotsen Institute of Archaeology Press. p. 235. ISBN9781938770456.
^Juliano, Annette L. (1991). "The Warring States Period—The State Of Qin, Yan, Chu, And Pazyryk: A Historical Footnote". Notes in the History of Art. 10 (4): 25–29. doi:10.1086/sou.10.4.23203292. JSTOR23203292. S2CID191379388.
^Cambridge History of Ancient China (1999), p 588.
^ abKhayutina, Maria (Autumn 2013). "From wooden attendants to terracotta warriors"(PDF). Bernisches Historisches Museum the Newsletter (65): 2, Fig.4. Also in Khayutina, Maria (2013). Qin: the eternal emperor and his terracotta warriors (1. Aufl ed.). Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. p. cat. no. 314. ISBN978-3-03823-838-6.
^Kuan Tzu, The Kuan Tzu Economic Dialogues in Ancient China. (tr. Tan, Po-fu, New Heaven, 1954), p 60.
^Rosen, Sydney (1978), "Changing conceptions of the Hegemon in pre-Qin China," Ancient China: Studies in Civilization. (ed. Roy, David). Hong Kong University Press, p 113.
^Cotterel, Artur (1981). The First Emperor of China: The Greatest Archeological Find of Our Time. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p 162.
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